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The Interest Deduction: Several New
Installments in a Continuing Saga
Leon Gabinet
(41BSERVERS of the federal tax scene have often noted a recur-
\1 ring phenomenon which enlivens the day-to-day work of the
entire tax fraternity. I refer, of course, to those general upheavals
caused by court decisions, treasury rulings, or new bits of legislation
which purport to settle touchy
issues.' The result of these peri-THE AUTHOR: LEON GABINET (Ph.B.,
J.D., University of Chicago) is an As- odic upheavals is a sharp in-
sociate Professor of Law at Case Western crease in the output of critics
Reserve University and is admitted to and commentators, all of which
the Oregon and Federal Bars and to
practice before the Tax Court of the raises the commentative caul-
United States. His teaching specialty dron to the boiling point. By
is Federal Taxation, the time the boil has quieted to
a simmer, a new issue and a new
pronouncement (or perhaps a new pronouncement about an old is-
sue) will appear upon the scene and the process will begin again.
The deduction for interest is no exception to the boil-simmer-boil
cycle. Although Code section 1632 contains brief and seemingly
straightforward provisions, the variety of transactions which lend
themselves to the use of the interest deduction has provided the
impetus for a loving exploration of its possibilities. By definition,
such taxpayer exploration focuses on the outer limits of the statu-
tory provisions. The administrative and judicial reaction to this
probing has again produced a shock wave, this time emanating from
two distinct centers. The first such center is Revenue Ruling
68-643,' dealing with the issue of prepayment of interest by cash
basis taxpayers. The second, and perhaps more important, center
encompasses three sections of the Tax Reform Act of 1969:' (1) Sec-
tion 221, which limits the deductibility of "excess investment inter-
est" over "net investment income" (as those terms are defined in
that section); (2) section 421, which authorizes the Commissioner
1 See the introductory remarks of Professor Sneed in Sneed, A Defense of the Tax
Court's Result in Prunier and Casale, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 339 (1958).
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163 [hereinafter cited as CODE].
3 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 76.
4 83 Stat. 487 [hereinafter cited as REFORM AcT].
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to issue regulations regarding the classification of corporate interests
as either stock or indebtedness; and (3) section 411, which limits
the deductibility of interest on certain corporate indebtedness issued
to acquire the stock or assets of another corporation.
These developments constitute new pronouncements relating to
old problems. Inevitably, they will give rise to analysis, speculation
and rethinking of taxpayer activity, for they embody some radically
new approaches. It is the purpose of this paper to examine and
evaluate these new substantive ground rules and to consider the
manner in which they redefine the deductibility of interest.
I. REVENUE RULING 68-643 AND PREPAID INTEREST
The developments which led to the promulgation of Revenue
Ruling 68-643 are not difficult to trace. Section 163 (a) permits a
deduction for "all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year
on indebtedness." 5 Since there is no limitation upon the nature of
the underlying indebtedness which gives rise to the interest obliga-
tion, it is clear that it applies both to business and nonbusiness in-
debtedness. The important phrase "paid or accrued within the tax-
able year" sets the stage for the entire prepayment of interest prob-
lem. The words "paid or accrued" are required to be construed in
accordance with the taxpayer's method of accounting.' Thus, a cash
basis taxpayer should be able to deduct interest when it is actually
paid. This being the case, a cash basis taxpayer is in a position to
exercise a considerable degree of control over the timing of his in-
terest deduction. Assuming an appropriate arrangement with the
lender, the taxpayer could prepay interest for several years and de-
duct the entire amount as paid in the taxable year in which he makes
the prepayment. If the interest item is deductible when "paid or
accrued" as that term relates to the taxpayer's accounting method,
then clearly the interest has been "paid" and deductibility appears
to be the natural consequence.
It was readily apparent to the Commissioner that the degree of
taxpayer control over the timing of the interest deduction afforded
by such a literal reading of the statute was undesirable. It would
be altogether too easy for a cash basis borrower to prepay a large
interest item in a year in which he had substantial income from other
sources, thereby sheltering that income by an inflated interest de-
5 CODE § 163(a).
Old. § 7701(a)(25).
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duction.' The Commissioner therefore resisted deduction of pre-
paid interest on the ground that in order to clearly reflect income,
a prepayment of interest should not be deductible currently, but
should be amortized over the period to which it relates - the entire
life of the loan or the portion thereof supported by the prepayment.
This argument was based upon section 41 of the Revenue Act of
1939,8 which, like its present counterpart, section 446(b),9 precludes
the use of an accounting method which does not clearly reflect in-
come. The argument was presented in John D. Fackler"° and was
rejected by the Tax Court which concluded that, in effect, the Com-
missioner was attempting to place the cash basis taxpayer on the
accrual basis with respect to interest prepayment. It reasoned that
a postpayment of the interest would clearly be deductible in the year
of payment and would result in no greater distortion of the taxpay-
er's income than the prepayment. As long as cash basis accounting
is permitted, there is bound to be some mismatching of income and
deduction items, and, therefore, the Tax Court felt that it would be
improper to place the taxpayer on an accrual basis as to only one
item, the interest deduction. The Fackler case was followed by the
decision in Court Holding Co." which again upheld a cash basis
taxpayer's right to deduct a prepayment of interest in the year of
disbursement. In 1945, the Commissioner, in what appears to have
been a concession of defeat, issued Income Tax Ruling 3740,12
wherein he ruled that a cash basis taxpayer could properly deduct a
5-year interest prepayment in the year of disbursement. Thereafter,
a number of cases were decided in the Tax Court which firmly es-
tablished the right to a current deduction for prepaid interest.'3
It should be noted that the cases which allowed the current de-
7 Taxpayers have used somewhat more sophisticated arrangements to achieve similar
results, with respect to both acceleration and deferral of the interest deduction. For ex-
ample, because a mere increase in the principal of the loan does not constitute interest
"paid" in the tax year, a deferral can be achieved by having a lending bank increase the
principal of an existing debt obligation by the amount of accrued but unpaid interest
Similarly, acceleration of the deduction can be achieved by having the lending bank
credit the borrower's account by the amount of the increase in the loan and then having
the borrower issue a check to meet the interest liability, thus insuring payment and cur-
rent deductibility. See Kanter, Interest Deduction: Use, Ruse, Refuse, 46 TAXEs 794,
798 (1968).
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 41, 53 Star. 24.
9 CODE § 446(b).
10 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939), acquiesced in, 1939-1 GuM. BULL. 11.
112 T.C. 531 (1943), acquiesced in, 1943 CuM. BULL. 5.
12 1945 CuM. BULL. 109.
1 3 Clifford F. Hood, 30 P-H Tax Cr. Mem. 1245 (1961); L. Lee Stanton, 34 T.C. 1
(1960); Joseph H. Konigsberg, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 49 (1946).
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duction for an interest prepayment were all cases in which a bona
fide indebtedness was present. The importance of the taxpayer's
good faith was unmistakably underscored in 1966, when the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied a deduction for prepaid
interest in three cases.. In each of them the bona fides of.the in-
terest transaction was the crucial issue. Two of the cases, Ippolito
v. Commissioner,4 and Barnett v. Commissioner,5 involved cash
basis, calendar year taxpayers who had won very substantial prizes
taxable as ordinary income in the year of receipt. In both cases, to-
ward the end of the tax year in which the prize was received, the
taxpayers borrowed large sums-with which they purchased govern-
ment obligations, prepaying interest on the loans (in Ippolito inter-
est was prepaid for 11 months and in Barnett for 9 months). In
January of the following year, the government obligations were sold,
the loans repaid, and the unearned interest refunded to the taxpay-
ers. The court held that the prepayment of interest was not de-
ductible because the transactions were "devoid of commercial real-
ity," a "sham," and that their only purpose was to secure an interest
deduction under section 163 (a).
The third case, Goldstein v. Commissioner,6 while arriving at
the same ultimate result, differs markedly from its companions.
Goldstein was a prizewinner who also incurred a large indebtedness,
prepaid the interest thereon, and used the proceeds to purchase gov-
ernment obligations. The government obligations were not sold
until 18 months later, at which time the debt was repaid and the
unearned interest refunded. In this case, the Second Circuit found
that the transaction was not a sham, but notwithstanding the reality
of the transaction, it found further that there was no "purposive
activity" in the entire series of events except for the securing of a
deduction for the prepaid interest. The court stated that the deduc-
tion was proper when "there is some substance to the loan arrange-
ment beyond the taxpayer's desire to secure the deduction.'1
7
The Ippolito, Barnett, and Goldstein triumvirate can easily qual-
ify as pronouncements which fed the fires under the commentative
cauldron, raising it to a boil. The Goldstein case has been particu-
larly favored with a great deal of comment and analysis because the
requirement that there be "purposive activity" in a transaction which
14364 F.2d 744 (2d Cr. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
15364 F.2d 742' (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
16 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
17 Id. at 741.
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otherwise creates a bona fide debt leaves something to be desired by
way of clarity.' 8 It is not, however, appropriate at this point to em-
bark upon a critique of Goldstein: What is important for the pres-
ent discussion is to note that, in the series of decisions from Fackler
to Goldstein and its companion cases, the courts had established the
proposition that a prepayment of interest in the normal, routine loan
transaction is deductible in the year of payment, except where the
loan transaction has no substance and is a "sham," or where the
transaction indicates no "purposive activity" other than the desire to
secure a tax deduction. In none of the three opinions which estab-
lished this exception was it suggested that the disallowance rests up-
on the distortion in income resulting from the deduction of prepaid
interest.
Perhaps if taxpayers had remained content with this state of af-
fairs and had limited their use of the prepaid interest deductions to
those routine transactions where, for example, some prepaid interest
is a condition of the loan, the Commissioner might also have been
content to let the matter rest. However, this is not the way of the
world. Success in shaping a loan transaction to fit the permissible
mold carries a substantial tax reward. To explore the possibilities
of success means to travel the outer limits of the permissible, poking
at the thin membrane which separates it from the forbidden.
Representative of this taxpayer probing are the so-called "Liv-
ingstone cases" which involved prepaid interest on elaborate loan
transactions that had little, if any, economic reality.'9 The courts
18 See, e.g., Webster, Prepaid Interest - Tax and Local Law Considerations for the
Payor and Payee, U. So. CAL. 1967 TAx INST. 381. It is difficult to define precisely
the exact meaning of the phrase "purposive activity," since the court seems to have used
it as part of a comprehensive theory of tax avoidance intended to have broad general
application beyond the immediate issue of prepaid interest. The more recent cases have
not refined the definition to any extent An example is Lifschultz v. Commissioner, 393
F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1968), where, in disallowing a deduction for prepaid interest, the
court held it unnecessary to determine if the transactions were a sham because it was per-
suaded that they were entered into without expectation of profit However, the loan
transactions in Lifschultz were clearly subject to attack as sham. Thus, the case does
establish the Goldstein approach as a general tax avoidance principle, but it does not indi-
cate a sufficient level of expectation of economic profit to negate the exclusiveness of
tax avoidance. The courts will have to give meaning to the phrase as the cases arise.
Until such decisions become available, we are left with a somewhat vague notion which
is short of the familiar "business purpose" rule and which requires an expectation of
profit beyond mere tax avoidance. See Kanter, supra note 7, at 828-29.
'0 See, e.g., Eli Goodstein, 30 T.C. 1178 (1958), aff'd, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959).
The "Livingstone" cases (which have immortalized Eli Livingstone, a Boston securities
broker who developed the basic format of the transaction) generally involved purchases
of government obligations with borrowed funds, with interest paid in advance. The
obligations were sold in a later tax year at a gain, thus utilizing the prior deduction for
prepaid interest to allow the taxpayer to achieve a capital gain position as the obligations
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had little difficulty in finding that these transactions were shams.
Not all such probing, however, results in transactions so patently ob-
jectionable. In recent years, for example, it has become common
practice to market land in southern California in a transaction sub-
stantially in this form: The buyer makes no down payment, but
agrees to prepay interest on the purchase price for 5 years. In the
sixth year, he commences to make payments of both principal and
interest, amortized over a 5-year period (but based on a 10-year
amortization with a balloon payment in the 10th year). Conceiv-
ably, this sort of transaction could run afoul of the Goldstein cri-
terion, particularly where the sale is followed by a default resulting
in return of unearned interest in a subsequent year. But even where
the transaction is allowed to run its normal course, the taxpayer is
stretching the prepaid interest deduction to unmerciful lengths,
though he may well have avoided the pitfall of the Goldstein case.
In these circumstances, the Commissioner can only attack the trans-
action on other grounds. He might, for example, argue that the
interest prepayment is really a down payment on the purchase price,
or that the transaction is really an option. Such arguments, how-
ever, are highly conceptualistic and would be difficult to sustain.
It is not surprising, then, that in Revenue Ruling 68 -64 3," the
Commissioner departed from his acquiescence in Fackler and Court
Holding Co., and withdrew Income Tax Ruling 3740. In essence,
the new ruling takes the position that any prepayment of interest
by a cash basis taxpayer for a period of more than 12 months follow-
ing the close of the tax year of the prepayment shall constitute a
material distortion of the taxpayer's income. In such cases, pursuant
to the authority granted the Commissioner by section 446(b) ,2
which provides for the use of a method of accounting which dearly
reflects income, he will require the taxpayer to accrue the prepaid
item ratably over the life of the loan. In cases of prepayment of
interest for less than a 12-month period following the close of the
year of prepayment, the issue of material distortion will be con-
sidered on a case-by-case basis. In short, the ruling places a cash
basis taxpayer on the accrual basis with respect to prepaid interest
neared maturity. However, the borrowing and purchase of the obligations were in many
instances spurious and the obligations were often never delivered to the customers. In
substance, the transactions amounted to no more than a great deal of paper shuffling cal-
culated to produce an interest deduction and capital gain. These transactions were gen-
erally classified as shams by the courts and their relation to Ippolito, Barnett, and Gold-
stein is readily apparent.
20 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 76.
21 CODE § 446(b).
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and reverses a.judicial and administrative policy of 23 years stand-
ing.. Moreover, it does so irrespective of whether the transaction is
"clean" in terms of the Ippolito, Barnett, and Goldstein criteria, or
whether it is somewhat questionable, as in the example of the Cali-
fornia land sale. The conceptual problems are swept away in favor
of an approach based on the right to insist upon a method of ac-
counting which dearly reflects income. We have thus come full
circle back to the situation which confronted the Fackler court.
Revenue Ruling 68-643 has received its first thoroughgoing
analysis at the hands of Professor Michael Asimow,2 who concludes
that the ruling was long overdue, that it should be given judicial
support, and that it is correct in principle. If the ruling is correct
in principle, then it was perhaps overdue and it should without a
doubt be upheld in the courts. But Professor Asimow's defense of
the ruling on "principle" raises some serious issues. , Before giving
the ruling unqualified endorsement, it seems proper to examine its
own express rationale as well as two extrinsic arguments which have
been marshalled in its defense. The ruling itself is expressly based
upon the proposition that a prepayment of interest causes a distor-
tion of the income of a cash basis taxpayer.3 In addition, the two
most important extrinsic arguments raised to support the ruling are
(1) that prepayment of interest is a capital expenditure and, there-
fore, should be capitalized, and (2) that prepayment, where refund-
able, is really only a deposit which is not deductible until consumed.
Each of these arguments will be separately considered.
A. The Distortion of Income Principle
The Commissioner adopted Revenue Ruling 68-643, pursuant to
the authority granted him by section 446(b), to require taxpayers to
use an accounting method which clearly reflects income.24 In effect,
the ruling places the cash basis taxpayer on the accrual basis with
respect to all interest which is prepaid for a period in excess of 12
months after the close of the year of prepayment. It conclusively
presumes that any such prepayment constitutes a material distortion
of income. Professor Asimow approves of this position and cites in
support of it two related propositions :25 (1) Sections 446(b) and
22 See Asimow, Principle and Prepaid Interest, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 36 (1968).
23 1968-2 CuM. BULL. at 77.
24 CODE § 446(b) provides: "If the method used does not clearly reflect income, the
computation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the
Secretary or his delegate, does clearly reflect income."
25 Asimow, supra note 22, at 51.
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461,.2 when read in the light of the legislative history of the latter
section, strongly support the Commissioner's ,broad discretion to re-
quire the use of a method of accounting which clearly reflects in-
come, and (2) there is a significant body of case law which sup-
ports the Commissioner's broad discretion in these matters.
The historical argument offered in support of the first proposition
does not, however, appear to be quite as conclusive as Asimow sug-
gests. The argument begins with section 200(d) of the Revenue
Act of 1924 (the forerunner of present section 461) which pro-
vided:
The deductions and credits provided for in this title shall be taken
for the taxable year in which "paid or accrued" or "paid and in-
curred," dependent upon the method of accounting upon the basis
of which net income is computed under section 212 or 232, unless
in order to dearly reflect the income the deductions or credits
should be taken as of a different period.27
The argument then moves to the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee Report wherein section 200(d) was proposed. The report
stated that authority is granted the Commissioner to "allow or re-
quire deductions and credits to be taken as of the year other than
that in which 'paid' or 'accrued' when, in his opinion, it is neces-
sary in order to clearly reflect the income."2 The report, however,
delimited the Commissioner's power by noting:
The necessity for such a provision arises in cases in'which a taxpayer
pays in one ,ear interest or rental payments or other items for a
period of years. If he is forced to deduct the amount in the year
in which it is paid, it may result in distortion of his income which
will cause him to pay either more or less taxes than he properly
should.29
From this language Professor Asimow deduces the Commissioner's
unlimited power to deny the deduction of prepaid interest. He con-
cludes the argument by noting that the enactment of section 461
without the clause "unless in order to dearly reflect the income, the
deductions or credits should be taken as of a different period," did
not result in any substantive change, and that there is general agree-
ment among the commentators to that effect.
It may well be that no substantive change was intended by dele-
2 6 CODE § 4 6 1(a) proviaes: '"The amount of any deduction or credit allowed by
this subtitle shall be taken for the taxable year which is the proper taxable year under the
method of accounting used in computing taxable income."
2 7 Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 200(d), 43 Stat. 254.
2 8 II. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1924) (emphasis added).
2 9Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
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tion of the "unless" clause in present section 461. However, from
the explanation of that clause contained in the House Ways and
Means Committee Report it seems very clear that blanket authority
was not given the Commissioner to automatically require a change
of accounting with respect to prepaid rent or interest. On the con-
trary, the report contemplates that the Commissioner is to examine
a taxpayer's situation to determine whether, in fact, income has been
distorted. While this process could properly lead to the conclusion
that certain prepayments distort income, it could not support the
disallowance of all prepayments. The report countenances the ex-
ercise of discretion, not the abdication thereof through the vehicle
of a conclusive presumption. Revenue Ruling 68-643, however, con-
clusively presumes that a prepayment for a period of more than 12
months following the year of prepayment is a material distortion of
income pure and simple. Granted, the taxpayer has a difficult
burden of proof in such cases, but it is highly unlikely that Congress
intended to elevate the presumption of official rectitude to the dig-
nity of an irrebutable presumption.
If legislative history is to be relied upon in support of the rul-
ing, it would be most appropriate to consider also the language in
the House Ways and Means Committee Report accompanying sec-
tion 221 of the Tax Reform Act of 1969." In that report, the Com-
mittee stated that it made no provision in section 221 for prepaid
interest in view of Revenue Ruling 68-643, which comports with its
concept of the law."' The Senate Finance Committee, however,
completely deleted section 221 in its version of the Reform Act, and
it was only in the final version of the bill as rewritten by the House-
Senate Conference Commitee that the section reappeared in its
present form. Neither the Senate Finance Committee Report,3 2 nor
the Report of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation,-
nor the Statement of the Managers of the House-Senate Conference
Committee 4 make any further reference to Revenue Ruling 68-643.
Thus, while the short statement in the House report is a strong
indication of approval of the ruling, the later legislative silence
30 REFORM AcT § 221 amends CODE § 163, by adding section 163 (d), a provision
which limits the amount of interest which may be deducted by individual taxpayers. For
a full discussion of section 221, see text accompanying notes 74-95 infra.
3 1 H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 73 (1969).
32S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
33 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91sr CONG.,
1ST SESS. SUMMARY OF H.R. 13270 TAX REFORM AcT OF 1969 (Comm. Print 1969).
4 H.R. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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leaves its conclusiveness on the issue open to question. Even if the
House statement is taken at face value, it is doubtful as to how
persuasive it would be in a judicial test of the ruling. In effect, the
statement is almost a parenthetical sentence appearing in a report
dealing with another matter, offering no enlightenment as to why
it approved a ruling so manifestly unfair to many taxpayers.
As for Professor Asimow's second proposition, cases such as
Fackler and Court Holding Co. certainly do not construe sections
446(b) and 461 to mean that the Commissioner has unbridled dis-
cretion to require a change of accounting method. Instead, they in-
dicate that the provision for cash basis accounting serves an impor-
tant function for the nonbusiness taxpayer in supplying a simple and
easily understood accounting method. Therefore, before denying
a taxpayer the right to use the method, either as to all items of in-
come and deduction or as to specific items, the Commissioner should
be required to show an abuse which does not result in a clear reflec-
tion of income. In concert with this article's interpretation of the
House Ways and Means Committee Report which proposed original
section 200(d), the case law indicates that sections 446(b) and 461
require the Commissioner to employ his discretion; they do not au-
thorize him to abdicate that discretion by adopting a blanket policy
of forcing pro rata accrual of prepaid interest. Since the legislative
history of these sections is at best inconclusive as to the propriety of
Revenue Ruling 68-643, what Professor Asimow is really telling us
is that he disagrees with the decisions in Fackler and Court Holding
Co.
The fact that accountants sometimes will not approve a cash
basis financial statement which differs too sharply from accrual
method accounting does not alter the foregoing conclusion. As
Professor Asimow points out,35 the proper treatment of prepaid ex-
penses by cash basis taxpayers is a matter of accounting judgment
about which many accountants differ. This being the case, it seems
that the Commissioner ought not to make a conclusive and binding
accounting judgment in an area in which there is considerable dis-
agreement. As long as the tax law specifically authorizes cash basis
accounting, and as long as interest is deductible under section
163 (a) when paid or accrued - as those terms are used in the con-
text of the taxpayer's accounting method,- the taxpayer should at
least have the opportunity of rebutting the assertion of distortion.
The Commissioner has apparently sensed the disturbing element
35 See Asimow, supra note 22, at 58.
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of unfairness in the ruling. This is indicated by two recent rulings
dealing with the subject of loan processing fees (points) paid by a
mortgagor-borrower to a lender as additional compensation for the
loan. In Revenue Ruling 69-188,36 the Commissioner ruled that
such a loan processing fee was a sum paid for the use or forebear-
ance of money and was therefore interest within the meaning of
section 163. Yet in Revenue Ruling 69-582,3r he ruled that a loan
processing fee of $1200 paid by a cash basis mortgagor in full in
the year the loan originated was fully deductible in that year. In a
cryptic statement, the ruling referred to a sentence in Revenue Rul-
ing 68-643 preceding the sentence in which the Commissioner creates
the conclusive presumption of distortion. That sentence reads:
"The Service now concludes that the deduction of prepaid interest
in the year of payment .. .may not result in a clear reflection of
income for the taxable year of payment."S Without any further
reference to the succeeding statements in which the presumption of
distortion for long term prepayments is set forth, Revenue Ruling
69-582 concludes that the deduction of $1200 in points (which clear-
ly is interest extending over the life of the loan) does not constitute
a material distortion of income. What are we to conclude from this
ruling? One possibility is that a $1200 prepayment is de minimis
and does not warrant the application of Revenue Ruling 68-643 -
even if it applies to a period of more than 12 months following the
year of prepayment. If so, what amount will be considered suffi-
cient? Another, and perhaps more significant, possibility is that
Revenue Ruling 69-582 was intended to modify Revenue Ruling
68-643 so as to permit deduction of points generally; perhaps any
amount payable as points will be deemed to be deductible in the
year of payment under this modification. In any event, while the
rationale of the later ruling is obviously unclear, its existence demon-
strates that something is vitally wrong with the flat statement that
all long term interest prepayments constitute material distortions of
income. We may, perhaps, see a variety of similar "modifications"
in the future.
In summary, sections 446(b) and 461 and their legislative his-
tories do not justify an extension of the Commissioner's authority
in accounting matters which would give him unbridled authority to
require pro rata accrual of prepaid interest. The House report
36 1969 INT. REV. BULL. No. 16, at 8.
37 1969 INT. REv. BULL. No. 47, at 9.
3 8 Id., quoting Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 76.
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statement accompanying section 221 of the Reform Act is a more
recent legislative pronouncement, but is also inconclusive. 'Given
the Code's approval of cash basis accounting, the Fackler and Court
Holding Co. cases are indications of judicial support for the deduc-
tion of prepaid interest in a clean" transaction. In the question-
able transactions, the Goldstein approach of disallowance when tax
avoidance is the only discernible motive is superior to the pro rata
accrual contained in Revenue Ruling 68-643.
B. "Capitalization" of Prepaid Interest
As an alternative to the distortion rationale, it has been sug-
gested that the prepayment of interest results in the acquisition by
the borrower of an intangible asset, the right to the use of money
extending over a period of time substantially beyond the taxable
year in which the interest is prepaid.39 In such cases, it is arguable
that the prepayment should not be currently expensed, but should be
deducted ratably over the life of the loan. In essence, the rationale
for capitalizing the prepaid interest is that section 263 (a)40 does not
allow a current deduction for capital expenditures, and since the in-
tangible asset created by the prepayment of interest is an asset ex-
tending beyond the taxable year, it should be treated as a nonde-
ductable capital expenditure.41 Unlike the distortion argument, the
proposition that prepaid interest creates an asset whose life extends
beyond the year of payment and which is recoverable only through
amortization has considerable merit. If we consider it only within
the context of section 263 (a), then it appears to be internally con-
sistent and a far more reasonable basis for disallowance of prepay-
ment than the position actually adopted by the Commissioner in
Revenue Ruling 68-643. Refinement of the capitalization argument,
however, points up some fatal weaknesses based upon its relation to
other specific Code provisions and to existing case law.
To begin with, there is great variety in the transactions which
involve interest prepayments. At one end of the spectrum is the
3 9 See L. Lee Stanton, 34 T.C. 1 (1960) (dissenting opinion); Webster, supra note
18, at 390.
4 0 CODE § 263 (a) provides in part: "No deduction shall be allowed for - (1) Any
amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements on betterments made
to increase the value of any property or estate."
4 1 See Asimow, supra note 22, at 59, wherein the author notes that because the pre-
payment will not be reflected during the period of the loan if it is currently deducted,
the general policy of section 263(a) "cuts across" section 163(a) - which allows a
deduction for all interest paid or accrued during a taxable year - and precludes Ihe im-
mediate deduction of the interest payment.
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ordinary loan transaction entered into by a nonbusiness borrower for
a bona fide nonbusiness purpose. At the other end are the sham
transactions exemplified by the "Livingstone" cases, 42 Ippolito, Bar-
nett, and (with modification) Goldstein.43 The theory that prepaid
interest is in the nature of a capital expense is really not apposite
in these extreme situations. In the case of the routine nonbusiness
loan, we are generally dealing with minimal prepayments for short
periods. In the sham and nonpurposive transactions, the amount
paid is not really interest, and, therefore, under the existing case
law deduction of the "interest" prepayment would be completely
disallowed. Where the theory may be helpful then is in those in-
termediate situations where neither the labels ordinary nor sham nor
nonpurposive activity can be easily affixed. Two kinds of cases are
illustrative. First, there is the common case in which the prepay-
ment of interest is an integral part of a transaction wherein the tax-
payer acquires or is enabled to carry an investment asset. An ex-
ample of such a transaction is a loan for the purpose of purchasing
securities in the hope that the gain on the securities will exceed the
cost of borrowing the funds. Second, there is the more sophisticated
use of interest wherein the interest deduction itself is immediately
converted into capital value.44 An example of the latter is the pre-
viously described purchase of southern California land with no
down payment, but requiring a prepayment of interest for several
years during which no principal payments are required.
Particularly in this second category of cases, the issue is not really
whether the interest should be capitalized and deducted pro rata
over the period of the loan; on the contrary, it is whether the pay-
ment is interest at all or merely a down payment. As pointed out
by several commentators,45 the effect of the transaction is to permit
the purchasing taxpayer to carry an asset in which the down payment
(if that is what the interest prepayment really is) is fully deductible
in the initial years during which the property may be increasing in
value. Later, the property may be sold and the increase in value
taxed at capital gain rates, thus permiting the creation of a capital
value based, in part, on a deductible investment. This is the kind of
transaction which concerns the commentators, who conclude that it
may present an appropriate situation for capitalization of prepaid
42 See note 19 supra.
43 See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
44 See Kanter, supra note 7, at 813.
45 See, e.g., id. at 814; Webster, supra note 18, at 390.
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interest. But on the other hand, does it not present a stronger case
for disallowance of the interest deduction altogether based on the
fact that the prepayment of interest is really a down payment of the
purchase price and not interest at all? This appears to be precisely
the reasoning which underlies Code sections 264(a) (1) and 264
(a) (2) ,'46 which prohibit the deduction of any amounts paid or ac-
crued on indebtedness incurred to purchase or carry single premium
annuity and insurance contracts and amounts paid or accrued to pur-
chase or carry any life insurance or annuity contract which contem-
plates systematic borrowing of annual increases in cash surrender
values. Like the California land transaction, a deduction allowed
for borrowing of cash surrender values to finance premium pay-
ments would result in a partially deductible investment which ulti-
mately produces a tax-free insurance fund, thereby permitting the
transmutation of interest into capital value. In such cases, disal-
lowance of the deduction is the proper solution, for the interest real-
ly represents a part. of the purchase price of the asset.
Another example of a transaction where capitalization of interest
prepayments is not regarded as a proper solution is represented by
a taxpayer who borrows funds to purchase or continue to carry se-
curities which produce tax exempt income. Section 265 (2)" 7 simply
disallows the interest paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred for
this purpose. The policy, of course, is to discourage borrowing
which leads to the acquisition of an asset that produces tax-free in-
come while the borrower enjoys an interest deduction on the funds
borrowed.48
It appears, then, that the statutory response to two important
categories of interest cases is not capitalization of interest either
normal or prepaid, but disallowance pure and simple. This pattern
is continued in new Code subsection 163 (d) ,4 which deals specif-
ically with the deductibility of interest on borrowed funds used to
purchase "investment property" producing little or no income. This
provision will be discussed in detail in the second part of this article,
but for the present, it is sufficient to point out that the statutory
response to the mismatching of investment income and interest ex-
46 CODE §§ 264(a) (1)-(2).
47 d. § 265(2).
4 8 The only exception to the disallowance of interest under section 265(2) is where
the taxpayer shows a valid business purpose to justify his incurring the obligation. See
Rev. Rul. 389, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 276.
4 9 CODE § 163 (d). See note 30 supra.
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pense (especially where it is prepaid) is simply to disallow that por-
tion of the interest expense which exceeds a specified base amount.
Because our real concern is with those taxpayers who use prepay-
ment of interest to establish immediate capital values or to acquire
an asset which produces no immediate taxable income (but a later
capital gain), it would appear that disallowance of the interest de-
duction is the appropriate answer in such cases. This seems to be
the congressional policy expressed in sections 264 and 265, and it
appears that this policy is being carried forward into new Code sub-
section 163(d), which covers most of the objectionable uses of in-
terest, prepaid or normal, of which Professor Asimow complains.
Similarly, disallowance is the result - and properly so - in the
cases where interest is merely one component of a transaction involv-
ing sham or nonpurposive activity designed to obtain a tax advan-
tage by artfully fashioning an interest deduction.
It seems, then, that if Revenue Ruling 68-643 were to be ration-
alized under the capitalization of interest theory, it would properly
be restricted to a relatively narrow range of taxpayer activity. It
would cover those business taxpayers who borrow for a perfectly
valid business reason in a routine transaction, as well as the non-
business borrower whose loan transaction is likewise free of any
sham or attempt to trade upon the interest deduction. Ironically,
these are situations in which the deduction is apt to be de minimis
and which are clearly not tax motivated. The ruling should not cover
the cases in which prepayment of interest is used as a means of es-
tablishing capital values, such as for the purchase of investment as-
sets which provide no immediate income or in the California land
transaction, because these cases are more properly disposed of by
analogy to the existing statutory pattern of total disallowance of the
interest deduction.
The theoretical basis of capitalization of interest remains a prob-
lem regardless of whether the foregoing analogy to the statutory
pattern of disallowance is accepted or rejected. The issue has been
discussed by several writers, and, in general, there are three objec-
tions to the notion that interest should be capitalized. First, the
simple statutory argument that section 163 (a) means what it says -
interest is deductible when "paid or accrued" within the taxable
year.1° Second, court decisions requiring other prepaid items to be
50 This was the basic argument in John D. Faclder, 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939). Profes-
sor Asimow calls it a "simplistic" argument and then proceeds to counter it with the fact
that, while section 162(a)(3) allows a deduction for "rentals" which have been "paid,"
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capitalized by cash basis taxpayers are based on significant differ-
ences in statutory language relating to such items. For example,
prepaid rentals must be capitalized because such prepayments are not
"ordinary and necessary" within the meaning of section 162(a). 51
Third, some cases have stressed consistency and long standing prac-
tice as the dispositive factor, e.g., business insurance cases in which
premiums have been prep~id.52 Each of these objections have been
met by equally forceful defenses. Thus the argument based on the
fact that interest is deductible under section 163 (a) when "paid or
accrued," without regard to any requirement that it be "ordinary
and necessary," is met by the assertion that it is "simplistic" and
that the statutory arrangement does not prevent a requirement that
prepaid interest be capitalized.13  A corollary to this line of argu-
ment is the assertion that there is no logical distinction between pre-
paid interest and prepaid rentals which are deductible under section
263 (a) (3) when paid, but which, according to the courts, must be
prorated if prepaid." The other examples of deductible prepay-
ments based on supposed differences in statutory language appli-
cable to such items - principally the "ordinary and necessary" lan-
guage of section 263 (a) - do not preclude capitalization of certain
expenses, since neither the words "ordinary and necessary" nor the
characterization of a deduction as an "expense" necessarily precludes
capital expenditure treatment of the item.5
While these thrusts and parries are intellectually stimulating,
they somehow seem to be on the periphery of the real problem. It
seems that virtually any prepayment by a cash basis taxpayer can
produce an asset which ought to be "capitalized" because its life
will by definition extend beyond the taxable year. But is this really
a meaningful statement or is it merely a semantic sleight of hand?
the courts have nevertheless required capitalization of prepaid rents. See Asimow, supra
note 22, at 67.
51 See Webster, supra note 18, at 395-99, wherein the author enumerates instances
where the "ordinary and necessary" language of section 162(a) is deemed either to
permit allowance or require disallowance of a prepaid item: (1) Intangible drilling ex-
penses; (2) prepaid salary or other compensation; (3) prepaid business supplies; and
(4) prepaid business insurance.
5 2 See, e.g., Waldheim Realty & Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 823 (8th Cit.
1957), wherein the court allowed the deduction of prepaid insurance premiums. Contra,
Commissioner v. Boylston Market Ass'n, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), aff'g 45 B.T.A.
1159 (1941). Happily, these business insurance cases are inconclusive; we-always-have-
done-it-that-way arguments are not paragons of logic.
63 See Asimow, supra note 22, at 67.
54 See Olincy, Prepaid Income and Expenses - Where Are We Going?, U. So.
CAL 1967 TAX INSr. 357, 376.
5 5 See Asimow, supra note 22, at 61-66.
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When we make such a statement, are we not really saying that we
object to cash basis accounting for tax purposes? To be more exact,
are we not saying that when deductions are involved, whether they
be "ordinary and necessary" business expenses or nonbusiness in-
terest, the cash basis produces an undesirable result? Is it not the
case that in many instances it is virtually impossible to draw a line
between a business interest prepayment which is ordinary and neces-
sary and one which creates an asset and, therefore, should be capi-
talized? When the Commissioner asserts that every prepayment of
interest for a period of more than 12 months beyond the taxable
year automatically creates a distortion of income, he is simply saying
that he disapproves of the cash basis accounting method. Once we
accept the central fact that it is cash basis accounting that is at issue,
the whole problem of capitalizing interest becomes irrelevant. All
prepayments by cash basis taxpayers are on the firing line, and de-
nial of the interest deduction is merely the latest casualty whose
longevity is attributable to its protected position in a separate sec-
tion which "simplistically" appears to permit current deduction of
prepayments. All that the capitalization argument amounts to is a
respectable cover for the automatic distortion argument adopted in
Revenue Ruling 68-643.
It is interesting to note that where a cash basis taxpayer receives
prepaid income, it has not been suggested that he should defer its
taxability to the year in which he will earn it by providing either
goods or services; on the contrary, a taxpayer is required to include
in his income any amount which is received during the taxable year
unless his method of accounting calls for inclusion as of a different
period.56 This principle applies to both cash basis and accrual basis
taxpayers.5 7  As to cash basis taxpayers, it is generally interpreted
to mean that actual receipt under a claim of right requires inclusion
of the receipt in the taxable year in which it is paid, although it may
be allocable to future tax years.5 It seems odd that in the name of
56 CODE § 451 (a) provides: "The amount of any item of gross income shall be in-
cluded in the gross income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless,
under the method of accounting used in computing tabable income, such amount is
properly accounted for as of a different period."
57 See Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963) (accrual); American Auto.
Ass'n v. Commissioner, 367 U.S. 687 (1961) (accrual); Chester Farrara, 44 T.C. 189
(1965) (cash).
58See, e.g., Gilken Corp. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1949), a1g 10
T.C. 445 (1948) (lease deposit treated as rental in year of receipt where lessee did not
exercise option to purchase property and lessor was a cash basis taxpayer). Questions
as to the propriety of inclusion of the receipt may arise where there are strings attached,
i.e., where it is not clear that retention of the item is intended. See, e.g., John Mantell,
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proper matching of items of income and expense, a cash basis tax-
payer engaged in a routine business transaction should be required
to report all prepaid income and to defer most prepaid expenses.
With respect to interest prepayments, it seems doubly strange that
the lender, if he is a cash basis taxpayer, should be required to report
the entire prepayment as income in the year of receipt, whereas the
borrower, also a cash basis taxpayer, should be required to prorate
the payment over the life of the loan. Granted, symmetrical treat-
ment of both taxpayers is not required and is perhaps undesirable
where policy considerations cut across the dictates of accounting
method and procedure, but in the limited range of transactions to
which Revenue Ruling 68-643 will probably now apply, it seems that
there is no important policy consideration requiring such asymmetry.
A general dislike for cash basis accounting is not a sufficient reason
for forcing deferral of all prepaid expenses and immediate inclusion
of all prepaid income, regardless of the taxpayer's accounting
method."9
Some accrual basis taxpayers have convinced Congress that the
policy of requiring inclusion of prepaid income in the year of re-
ceipt is contrary to sound accounting principles. In 1957, section
455 was enacted to permit accrual basis publishers to elect to defer
subscription income. In 1960, section 45661 was enacted to permit
accrual basis membership associations to elect to defer prepaid dues
for a period of up to 36 months.62  Even before the enactment of
section 455, the Commissioner had ruled in Income Tax Ruling
3369' that deferral of subscription income would be allowed if the
costs allocable to obtaining the subscription were likewise deferred
17 T.C. 1143 (1952). However, where retention appears definite at the time of re-
ceipt, a later event requiring restoration of the receipt does not prevent its inclusion in
the year of receipt. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
59 The repeal of section 452 is often cited as evidence of congressional rejection of
deferral of prepaid items by accrual basis taxpayers. This section would have permitted
deferral of prepaid income and its repeal appears to have been a very significant factor
in the Supreme Court's decision in American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S.
687 (1961), in which an accrual basis taxpayer was denied the right to defer prepaid
membership dues. The Court reasoned that the taxpayer could not determine when it
would be required to render services for which the dues were paid, hence its system of
deferring the income as well as some of its operating expenses to future periods was
artificial. The decision, however, seems to be based as well upon the inference of con-
gressional intent drawn from the repeal of section 452.
60 COD E § 455.
611d. § 456.
6 2 CODE § 456, which, in effect, reverses American Auto. Ass'n v. United. States, 367
U.S. 687 (1961).
63 1940-1 CuM. BULL. 46.
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so that there was no material distortion of his income. It seems
unfair, then, that a cash basis taxpayer should not be permitted the
opportunity to show that his prepayment of an interest item does not
materially distort income (just as it is inequitable that not all ac-
crual basis taxpayers enjoy the benefits of sections 455 and 456 and
of Income Tax Ruling 3369). Revenue Ruling 68-643 merely ac-
centuates the existing inequities.
C. The eDeposit" Argument
It has been suggested that Revenue Ruling 68-643 could also be
defended on the ground that where a cash basis taxpayer is entitled
to a refund of unearned prepaid interest upon early payment of the
loan, the interest has not been paid, but is really only a "deposit"
subject to recovery.64 This argument is supported by analogy to the
cases involving prepayments for animal feed and particularly to
Tim W. Lillie,65 the most recent of these cases. There the taxpayer
prepaid for enough cattle feed to support his animals for several
years. The taxpayer did not contract for preferential treatment in
the event of shortages, nor was he given any other advantage, and,
thus, the prepayment motivation was apparently the tax advantage
gained by the deduction. The Commissioner argued that the pre-
payment was a deposit and the Tax Court concurred in this view of
the transaction because, the prepayment was refundable. The ap-
proach of Revenue Ruling 68-643 is clearly analogous to the Lillie
case. The Commissioner does not deny ultimate deductibility of the
item, but requires its proration over the period to which it is proper-
ly applicable; refundable prepaid interest is viewed as a deposit, just
as was Mr. Lillie's feed prepayment.
One commentator has already pointed out the first weakness of
this position.6 He argues that in Lillie, the prepayment for feed
had no particular relation to the taxpayer's business investment. In
other words, there was no business purpose to be furthered or busi-
ness advantage to be gained thereby, so basically the case really
should be tested against the "purposive activity" rule of Goldstein.
64 See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 22, at 69-74; Webster, supra note 18, at 410-11.
65 45 T.C. 54 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 370 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1966).
66 Kanter, supra note 7, at 808-09.
67 Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1005 (1967). It should be noted that in several cases prior to Lillie, the courts had per-
mitted prepayments for feed where a valid business purpose existed for the prepayment.
See, e.g., Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1959), rev'g 30 T.C. 903
(1958).
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While in Goldstein no nontax purpose was served by either the cur-
rent or the prepaid interest, in Lillie only the prepayment of interest
was nonpurposive; the current payments were made to support a
viable feed lot operation. Therefore, the Goldstein rationale should
be applied only to the nonpurposive prepayment, with the result that
accrual, not disallowance, would constitute the proper relief.
A second difficulty with the deposit treatment of interest is that
in cases not involving sham or nonpurposive activity, it requires a
tacit assumption that the parties intended a refund of the interest.
In the previously mentioned California land transaction, for exam-
ple, equity demands that the Commissioner show that the parties
contemplated an early payment of the purchase price or perhaps
even a default which would result in application of the prepaid in-
terest to the purchase price. If such an intention can be shown, the
deposit theory may apply, but on the other hand, this would be ade-
quate evidence of sham or nonpurposive activity, in which case the
interest should be disallowed and not merely prorated. If there is
no evidence from which an intention to effect a refund can be in-
ferred and if the prepayment had a valid business purpose, it would
be improper to apply the deposit theory of the Lillie case. Thus in
ordinary, bona fide interest transactions, where refundability is not
contemplated but can occur only with reference to a later contingent
event, Lillie is inapplicable. There is no intention that the refund
will take place and the recipient of the interest would be required
to include the prepayment in his income for the year of receipt."'
Similar treatment should be accorded the payor; a deposit is not
intended and the deduction should be allowed.
If the interest is in fact refunded, the Code and Regulations now
provide that the restoration is included in the income of the tax-
payer who receives the refund, an amount previously deducted, at
least to the extent of the tax benefit derived from the deduction.
69
This seems to be the preferred method of handling the restoration
of the deposit, because it does no violence to the annual accounting
concept and avoids the use of a transactional approach - awaiting
the ultimate outcome of numerous transactions to determine their
tax consequences. If one really wishes to await the ultimate out-
68 See Gilken Corp. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1949), aff'g 10 T.C.
445 (1948).
6 9 CODIE § 111 allows an exclusion from gross income of recovered bad debts and
taxes except to the extent that a previous year's deduction for such items resulted in tax
benefit. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1 (a) (1956) extends this provision to "all other losses, ex-
penditures, and accruals made the basis of deductions from gross income for prior tax-
able years."
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come of such a transaction, it would make more sense to treat it as
a discount loan and to have the payor of the interest deduct the
prepayment when he has repaid the loan. Economically, a prepay-
ment of $80 interest on a $1000 loan is no different from having the
lender credit the borrower's account in the amount of $920, though
the principal indebtedness is $1000. It is dear, however, that in
the latter situation the courts regard the interest as unpaid until the
principal is repaid, and only then is the interest deductible. ° If the
two situations are the same economically, and if we do not permit
the deduction in the latter until the loan is paid, then there is no
reason requiring deferral of the prepayment in the former. Why
is it, then, that Revenue Ruling 68-643 makes such a distinction?
Why does it not treat both payments as subject to proration over the
period of the loan? Can it be that the Fackler court was right, and
that since a postpayment of interest does not cause a distortion of
income, neither does a prepayment? How else do we account for
the Commissioner's strange silence on the subject of postpayments
and discount loans in Revenue Ruling 68-643?
II. THE "INVESTMENT INTEREST" PROVISIONS OF THE
REFORM ACT
The Act creates new Code section 163 (d) ,71 which embodies a
significant extension of the principle that a taxpayer ought not to
be permitted to use the interest deduction either to purchase an in-
vestment asset which produces no offsetting ordinary income or to
transmute it into a capital value. It has previously been noted72 that
sections 264(a) and 265 represent limited applications of this prin-
ciple to interest on indebtedness used to purchase insurance or carry
obligations the interest from which is tax exempt. Section 163(d)
simply extends this principle by restricting the amount of interest
which may be deducted on an indebtedness incurred to carry or pur-
chase other property held for investment.
The abuse which this provision is designed to correct is set forth
in the House Ways and Means Committee Report on House Bill
13270,73 the original version of the Tax Reform Bill. Briefly, the
report states that the restriction on deductibility of "investment in-
70 See, e.g., J.R. Hopkins, 15 T.C. 160 (1950). See also I.T. 3298, 1939-2 Ctum.
BULL. 164; Rev. Rul. 63-57, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 103.
71 CODE § 163(d) was created by section 221 of the REFORM ACT.
72 See note 48 supra & text accompanying notes 46-48.
73 H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 73-74 (1969).
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terest" - interest on indebtedness incurred to purchase or carry in-
vestment assets - is aimed at those taxpayers whose borrowings for
investment purposes is motivated by tax considerations rather than
straightforward investment considerations. The report assumes that
a taxpayer who is investment motivated will generally invest in
property which will produce a profit to offset the cost of borrowing.
However, if the investment produces little or no current ordinary in-
come, under existing law the effects of allowing a current interest
deduction are the mismatching of the ultimate income from the
investment with its related interest expense and the sheltering of
current ordinary income from other sources. Because borrowing is
voluntary, the act of incurring a large debt and a correspondingly
substantial interest deduction indicates that the aforementioned tax
considerations are the motivating factors in the borrowing. Conse-
quently, the report concludes that it would be inappropriate to allow
current interest deductions on such voluntary borrowing where the
interest exceeds the income from the investment.
The mechanism for implementing the limited interest denial ap-
plies to investment interest on all indebtedness incurred in taxable
years commencing with 1972. The new section 163 (d), as enacted
by Congress in lieu of the original provisions of section 211 of
House Bill 13270, limits the amount of investment interest74 which
may be deducted by an individual taxpayer to $25,000, plus the
amount of "net investment income," 75 plus an amount equal to the
excess of net long-term capital gains over net short-term capital
74 "Investment interest" is defined in subsection 163(a)(3)(D) as "interest paid or
accrued on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry property held for
investment" However, this definition is not very helpful because "property held for
investment" is not defined.
75 "Net investment income" is defined in subsection 163 (d) (3) (A) as "the excess
of investment income over investment expenses." Subsection 163 (d) (3) (B) defines
"investment income" as:
(i) the gross income from interest, dividends, rents, and royalties,
(ii) the net short-term capital gain attributable to the disposition of
property held for investment, and
(iii) any amount treated under sections 1245 and 1250 as gain from the
sale or exchange of property which is neither a capital asset nor property
described in section 1231,
but only to the extent such income, gain, and amounts are not derived from
the conduct of a trade or business.
Subsection 163 (a) (3) (C) defines "investment expenses" as the deductions authorized in
sections 164(a)(1) (state, local, and foreign real property taxes) and, to the extent that
they are "directly involved in the production of investment income, the deductions au-
thorized in sections 166 (bad debts), 167 (depredation - herein straight line only);
171 (amortization of bond premiums), 212 (ordinary and necessary expenses incurred
in the production, conservation, and management of income producing property), and
611 (depletion -herein cost depletion only).
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losses for the taxable year, plus one-half of the excess of investment
interest over the sum of the three preceding items. Thus, the first
$25,000 of interest remains deductible, and any excess is next ap-
plied against net investment income. Any remaining excess is then
applied against the excess of net long-term capital gains over net
short-term capital losses, and if any excess still remains only one-
half of it may be deducted. Subject to certain limitations, the bal-
ance may be carried over indefinitely to succeeding tax years.76  To
the extent that the taxpayer has net long-term capital gains which
increase the amount of his deductible investment interest, such gains
are treated as gains from the sale of noncapital assets. Therefore,
the 50 percent deduction normally available for capital gains under
section 120277 is denied and they are treated as ordinary income.78
However, the gain is not treated as a preference item under new
section 57(a) (9).79
From a purely practical point of view, section 163 (d) will affect
only a very small number of taxpayers. If a taxpayer has net invest-
ment interest expense of $25,000 in 1972 and no investment income
or capital gains whatsoever, the $25,000 exemption would allow him
to deduct the full amount of his interest expense. But in order to
pay $25,000 interest in one year, assuming an 8 percent interest rate,
the taxpayer would have to have borrowed approximately $313,000!
Moreover, a taxpayer with substantial capital gains will be able to
borrow much larger amounts, since his investment interest in excess
76 The carryover is treated as investment interest paid or accrued in the succeeding
year, but deductibility of the carryover is limited to one-half of the excess of net invest-
ment income for such year plus $25,000 over the greater of (1) investment interest paid
or accrued in such year or (2) $25,000. If the entire carryover cannot be deducted in
the second year, then the amount to be carried over to the third year is reduced by 50
percent capital of the taxpayer's right to the capital gains deduction under section 1202
(whether or not that right is exercised). The following example will illustrate the op-
eration of the carryover:
Assume T has disallowed investment interest in the amount of $37,000 in 1972.
In 1973 he has net investment income of $60,000, capital gain of $8,000, and invest-
ment interest expense of $50,000:
1973
(a) Net Investment Income (60,000) + 25,000 85,000
(b) Greater of investment interest (50,000) or 25,000 --------- 50,000
(c) Investment interest deduction (/2 of (a) less (b)) -------- 17,500
(d) Nondeductible (amount disallowed in 1972 less (c)) ------- 19,500
(e) 50% of 1973 capital gain ------------------------------ 4,000
(f) Disallowed investment interest carried to 1974 ((d) less (e)) - 15,500
77 CODE § 1202 provides in part; "In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation,
if for any taxable year the net long-term capital gain exceeds the net short-term capital
loss, 50 percent of the amount of such excess shall be a deduction from gross income."
7 8 CODE § 163(d)(5).
791d. § 57(a)(9).
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of $25,000 may be deducted to the extent of his capital gains. The
number of taxpayers whose borrowing capacity exceeds $313,000 is
probably fairly limited; yet it is apparently in this limited group that
nonbusiness borrowing is used to obtain the significant tax advan-
tages set forth in the House Ways and Means Committee Report.
Because of the cryptic nature of the definitional subsections, it
is impossible to predict with specificity the transactions covered by
section 163 (d). As the statute presently stands, there is no defini-
tion of the term which provides the key to the section's scope, "prop-
erty held for investment." 80  Thus it appears that one of the first
orders of business in connection with the new provision is a clarifica-
tion of whether business interests are "property held for invest-
ment." The only possible analogy to existing statutory language -
the definition of the term "capital asset"' 1 - is not sufficiently pre-
cise so as to define the new phraseology, for the capital asset defini-
tion is designed to separate capital gain from ordinary income, not
to separate the taxable from the exempt. The investment interest
provision has introduced a new phrase and a new class of property
to which present statutory classifications are not applicable.
The House report's statement that interest on funds borrowed
"in connection with a trade or business" is exempt from the limi-
tation 2 sheds some light on the aforementioned definitional prob-
lem. Presumably, the language means that all business borrowing
is exempt. But with respect to the purchase of new business inter-
ests as opposed to assets purchased for use in an existing line of
business, can we stretch the meaning of "in connection with a trade
or business" to include interest on borrowed funds? Would it make
any difference if the business interest is a partnership interest as
opposed to corporate stock? A partner, of course, is in the same
business as his partnership, but a stockholder is not necessarily in the
same business as his corporation. Thus, an individual shareholder
who guarantees his controlled corporation's obligation may not de-
duct his payment of the obligation as a business bad debt."' Would
80 See note 74 supra.
8 1 CODE § 1221 defines the term "capital asset" as "property held by the taxpayer
(whether or not connected with his trade or business) " subject to five exceptions, three
of which are directly related to the use of the item in connection with the taxpayer's
trade or business.
8 2 H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 73 (1969). The phrase "in
connection with a trade or business" is incorporated into section 163(d)(3)(B), which
defines "investment income."
83 Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956). Under section 166(d), a non-
business bad debt is treated as a short-term capital loss. However, section 166(f) permits
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the same reasoning apply to the purchase of closely held stock so as
to prevent the interest incurred pursuant to the stock's acquisition
from being treated as incurred "in connection with the trade or busi-
ness"? These questions remain unanswered and the legislative his-
tory offers no hint as to how they will or ought to be answered.
The issue of borrowing "in connection with a trade or business"
will create innumerable definitional problems quite apart from the
question of the purchase of business interests. For example, will the
reasoning of Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissionet' be ap-
plied to cases arising under the new section 163 (d) ? In that land-
mark case, a manufacturer of corn products purchased corn futures
as a hedge against the possibility of both a short supply of corn and
price increases. The taxpayer sold some of its futures at a very sub-
stantial profit and claimed that its gain was a capital gain. The
Court held, however, that the gain was ordinary income. The basic
issue, of course, was whether the corn futures were "capital assets"
as defined in section 1221 or whether the future transactions were
inseparable elements of the taxpayer's business. The Court rea-
soned that although the futures contracts were "property held by the
taxpayer" which did not fall precisely within any of the exceptions
listed in section 1221(1) - inventory, stock in trade, or property
held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness - they were nevertheless so integrally connected with the tax-
payer's business that the profit from their sale should be treated as
ordinary income. The general definition of "capital asset" was con-
sidered by the Court to apply to assets which are not the source of
normal business income, thus the exclusions are to be interpreted
broadly and the definition of a capital asset applied narrowly.
Suppose Corn Products Refining Co. had borrowed substantially
to engage in its futures operations. Would the futures operations
be considered so vitally important to the company's business that the
borrowing would be considered "in connection with the trade or
business" so as to render it free of the section 163(d) limitation?
Since there is no easy answer to this question, we will, no doubt,
reenact the Corn Products story with a wealth of variation in the
context of section 163(d) .85 It remains to be seen if the term "prop-
a noncorporate guarantor of a noncorporate obligation to deduct his worthless debt as
a fully deductible business bad debt if the proceeds of the loan were used in the bor-
rower's trade or business.
84 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
85 The general view of the commentators is that Corn Products introduced an ele-
ment of unnecessary doubt and complexity into the provisions of section 1221 without
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erty held for investment" will be interpreted as narrowly as the
Court interpreted the term "capital asset" in Corn Products, or
whether a different definitional principle will be applied to cases
involving a denial of the interest deduction.
Before concluding the discussion of the scope of section 163 (d),
one more aspect of the provision should be noted: It does not apply
to corporations. 6 The reason for this remarkable exclusion is not
at all clear. A corporation is as capable as an individual of borrow-
ing for the purpose of investing in non-income-producing investment
property - and generally does so for the same reasons. Not all
corporate borrowing is business related. Because the corporation is
as capable of trading on the interest deduction as is an individual,
there appears to be no reason to exclude it from the effect of any
corrective legislation. Perhaps the draftsmen felt that a 48 percent
tax rate - the corporate normal tax and surtax - is not sufficiently
high so as to make borrowing for tax avoidance purposes attractive
to corporate taxpayers. Whatever the reason, there seems to be no
justification in principle for placing corporations beyond the reach
of the legislation.
One cannot help wondering if the complexities of section
163 (d) were really necessary in order to curb the borrowing activi-
ties of a small group of affluent taxpayers, since it is entirely pos-
sible that the principles developed in existing case law might well
have been extended to result in denial of the deduction for invest-
ment interest. Because voluntary borrowing to purchase non-
income-producing assets is itself an indication of a tax avoidance
motive, could not the Goldstein principle 7 have been extended to
cover current interest deductions where there is no "purposive ac-
tivity" other than a tax advantage? In effect, this is what the in-
vestment interest limitation has accomplished, but it has done so
without the selectivity embodied in the "purposive activity" rule of
Goldstein. It may well be that by far the greatest revenue loss arises
from investment interest paid on borrowings of considerably less
than the $313,000 necessary to offset the $25,000 exemption. By
setting up a mechanical formula to regulate the deduction of invest-
ment interest which will adversely affect only a very few - and
admittedly, only very, very rich - taxpayers, Congress has effectively
providing any real guide for lower courts to follow in this difficult definitional area.
See, e.g., Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 235
(1961); Freeman, Is There a New Concept of Business Asset?, 36 TAxEs 110 (1958).
8 6 CODE § 163(d)(1).
8 7 See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
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prevented the general operation of a more flexible principle such
as that developed by the courts in Goldstein for all taxpayers. If
section 163(d) is interpreted as providing the exclusive means
of taxing investment interest, then of course there will be no way
of reaching the taxpayer who invests in non-income-producing prop-
erty, has no capital gain or investment income, and keeps his bor-
rowing down to a mere $313,000 (at an assumed 8 percent interest
rate). It seems clear that the statutory provision is intended to be
exclusive and that the courts will probably not have an opportunity
to pass upon the tax avoidance aspects of investment interest as it
affects large numbers of taxpayers.
Another major difficulty of the investment interest provision is
that its underlying assumption is tax avoidance. In other words, any
transaction involving the acquisition of non-income-producing prop-
erty with borrowed funds may be caught within a wide-ranging and
entirely indiscriminate net. One cannot grieve over the predicament
of the purchaser of California land whose purchase is financed sole-
ly with prepaid interest. On the other hand, what of the taxpayer
who because of business exigencies is forced to borrow funds to pur-
chase what can only be described as a non-income-producing invest-
ment asset? An example is the surviving shareholder of a closely
held corporation who must buy the interest of the deceased share-
holder pursuant to the terms of a mandatory buy-sell agreement. If
the agreement is of the cross-purchase variety and has not been
funded with insurance, it may well be that the survivor can effect
the purchase only with borrowed funds. If he does so, he is buying
an investment asset which probably does not produce current income.
If the purchasing shareholder has no capital gain or net investment
income against which to offset the interest on the loan, he may well
find himself with nondeductible "excess investment interest." When
borrowed funds are used to effect the purchase of the decedent's
stock in these circumstances, one cannot accuse the borrower of de-
liberately seeking to mismatch his interest deduction and the ulti-
mate income from the purchased asset. The application of section
163 (d) to such a situation would not advance the congressional pur-
pose and would only create unnecessary difficulties for a borrower
engaged in a perfectly legitimate and desirable transaction.
If the required purchase of a decedent's business interest by a
surviving shareholder or partner is within the purview of section
163 (d) we may expect two results. The first is a possible windfall
to the insurance industry because it will be necessary to fund cross-
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purchase agreements in order to avoid the need to borrow where the
purchase price is such that the interest on the loan will exceed
$25,000. Many cross-purchase agreements are now funded with
insurance, but it seems inappropriate to force taxpayers into insur-
ance funding where they prefer not to do so. Indeed, they may be
unable to do so in cases of uninsurability. A second result may be
that shareholders of a closely held corporation will be forced to use
the entity buy-out method rather than the cross-purchase agreement.
This will follow from the fact that the corporation can borrow with
impunity because subsection 163 (d) (1) specifically excludes corpo-
rations from the investment interest limitation. An entity buy-out,
however, is not always the procedure of choice, especially where bor-
rowing to redeem stock is undesirable from the corporation's point
of view and where insurance funding is not feasible."8
A related problem is presented by the situation in which a tax-
payer is required to pay the purchase price of a business interest in
installments because the seller wishes to report on the installment
basis"" or because the purchaser is making a shoestring purchase and
expects to pay the purchase price out of the earnings of the business.
8 8 In the case of a partnership, borrowing by the partnership to finance the buy-out
would result in a pass-through of nondeductible investment interest to the partners
under subsection 163(d)(4)(B). This could, perhaps, be avoided on the theory that
the partnership's purchase of a deceased partner's interest does not constitute the pur-
chase of "property held for investment." See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
8 9 CODE § 453 permits the usual seller of personal property to report his gain on the
sale as he receives installment payments. The portion of the installment payment rep-
resenting principal is divided into two parts, one representing a return of capital and
the other representing gain. The portion representing gain is computed by determining
the ratio of profit to basis on the entire purchase price and applying the same ratio to
each installment of principal. However, installment purchases may not be covered by
section 163(d). The House Ways and Means Committee Report accompanying its pro-
posed new section 163 (d) provided:
This limitation is to be applicable only to interest on indebtedness incurred
or continued to purchase or carry property held for investment. Thus, inter-
est incurred on funds borrowed for other purposes such as a home mortgage,
installment purchases, consumer goods, and personal or student loans would
not be affected by the limitation. In addition, funds borrowed in connec-
tion with a trade or business would not be affected by the limitation. H.R.
REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 73 (1969) (emphasis added).
Since the Report specifically mentions "installment purchases," perhaps the intention is
that installment purchases of a business interest wil be exempt. It is hardly likely that
all installment purchases of "property held for investment" were intended to be free of
the limitation, since such a construction would simply defeat the legislation. The
question is, what installment purchases are intended to be exempt from the limitation?
Given the fact that the report framed its reference to installment purchases between
home mortgages and consumer goods, it seems that what was probably intended was that
interest on installment purchases of consumer goods be exempt from the limitation. If
this is the case, then the legislative history does nothing to dear up the problem of
whether installment purchases of business interests or of other property qualify as pur-
chases of "property held for investment."
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Because every installment will have an interest element, the install-
ment interest paid during the year may become nondeductible excess
investment interest. This can occur in the mandatory buy-out, in
which case the objection to the denial of a deduction for installment
interest would be the same as the objection to denial of interest on
a loan from a third party used to finance the purchase. But even
where the purchase of the business interest is voluntary, the insist-
ence of the seller or the financial position of the purchaser may
dictate an installment transaction involving installment interest
which may be classified as excess investment interest. Clearly this
places undesirable obstacles in the path of perfectly legitimate and
desirable business transactions.
The foregoing discussion points up the inevitable risk that is en-
countered in the establishment of an objective statutory standard for
treating taxpayer activity which inherently involves subjective ele-
ments of motive and intent. The object of section 163(d) is to
discourage abuse of the interest deduction. It does so by setting up
a complex system of objective standards which purport to prevent
such abuse without jarring the hornet's nest of taxpayer intent. The
result is that its objective standard will apply to "clean" borrowing
transactions which should not be discouraged and which are not en-
tered into for the purpose of trading on the interest deduction.
Again, one cannot help wondering if the attempt to objectify stand-
ards of taxpayer behavior is worth the difficulty which is created
in the process and if perhaps the courts are not better able to handle
such problems under a constantly growing "common law" of federal
taxation.90
With respect to section 163 (d), it may be argued that the risk
involved in creating an objective standard for denial of excess invest-
ment interest, i.e., the risk of penalizing taxpayers whose borrowing
motives are legitimate, is considerably reduced by virtue of the blan-
ket $25,000 exemption which applies to all interest on funds bor-
rowed for investment purposes. Even a taxpayer who borrows out
of business and investment need rather than tax avoidance motives
will, after all, enjoy the benefit of a $25,000 exemption for his ex-
cess investment interest. Since few individual taxpayers will be bor-
rowing sums large enough to generate annual interest deductions of
$25,000 or more, the $25,000 exemption provision offers adequate
protection for the "dean" investment interest transaction. But even
if available statistics fully supported this contention, it does not jus-
90 See Brown, supra note 85.
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tify the fact that deliberate tax avoidance through timely borrow-
ing is given a safe harbor. It simply does not make sense to at-
tempt to draw a line between big tax avoiders and little tax avoiders,
particularly when the line is so drawn that many taxpayers whose
avoidance is very substantial are given the advantage of statutory
protection. There is no magic in the $25,000 figure which is al-
lowed as an exemption and there ought to be none. It seems that,
given the present structure of the investment interest provision, no
amount of tinkering with its exclusionary provisions would further
its purported objectives or avoid its unintended evils. For example,
while the $25,000 exemption might be eliminated, or a graduated
schedule embodying an inverse relationship between the aggregate
amount of interest paid and the amount of deductible "investment
interest" might be substituted for the present statutory formula,9
the provision would still operate equally on taxpayers who borrow to
purchase investment assets solely for tax avoidance purposes and
those who do so out of legitimate investment need. The basic diffi-
culty is that the statute fails to distinguish between these borrowers
and simply assumes that all borrowing to purchase investment assets
is "tainted" borrowing.
The discussion of alternatives and possible revisions of section
163 (d) leads to another problem which must inevitably arise in its
administration and which apparently was not considered by the
draftsmen. If a taxpayer borrows funds to purchase investment as-
sets and finds that a portion of his excess investment interest is dis-
allowed as a current deduction, why can he not claim that the dis-
allowed interest should be added to his basis in the investment
property under section 101292 as part of the cost of acquisition?
Under section 266"3 a taxpayer may, at his option, elect to treat
amounts paid or accrued for "carrying charges" and taxes as al-
locable to the capital account rather than currently deducting such
taxes and carrying charges. The regulations specify that such capi-
talized carrying may include interest on a loan in the case of real
9 1 For a similar suggestion relating to disallowance of interest on corporate debt
issued to finance acquisitions, see Sax, The Conglomerate and Tax Reform: A Brief Re-
view, 25 TAx L. REv. 235, 250-52 (1970).
92 CODE § 1012 provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the basis of property
shall be its cost. Presumably, the carryover provisions are designed to ultimately permit
the deduction of disallowed excess investment interest, so that treating the disallowed
interest as an addition to basis would not be necessary. However, the carryover privi-
lege may not accomplish this result due to the limitations contained in section
163(d)(2). See note 76 supra.
93 CODE § 266.
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property, whether improved or unimproved. 4 With respect to per-
sonal property, the regulations specifically allow the taxpayer to
capitalize "interest on a loan to purchase such property or to pay for
transporting or installing the same.'"'" The reason that the taxpayer
is given the option to capitalize interest is, of course, that he has
always had the privilege of currently deducting interest, taxes, and
certain other carrying charges. Now, however, with the introduc-
tion of section 163(d), excess investment interest will be nonde-
ductible. There seems to be no reason why such a nondeductible
carrying charge should not be capitalized and added to basis. While
the option provision of section 266 would not expressly apply be-
cause the taxpayer does not have the choice between capitalizing or
deducting the expense, the principle is certainly applicable. Interest
on a loan used to buy property is a carrying charge, and if it cannot
be expensed currently, it should certainly be added to the cost of the
property. If a taxpayer has the right to capitalize the item when he
has the option of deducting it, he should certainly have the right to
do so when he does not have the option of deducting it.
The Commissioner has no ground for objecting to the capitali-
zation of disallowed excess investment on the theory that it defeats
the punitive effect of section 163(d). The reason for the enact-
ment of that provision is to discourage deliberate mismatching of
investment expense and investment income. No more perfect match-
ing of investment income and expense can be achieved under a sys-
tem where the amount realized on the disposition of an asset is tax-
able in the tax year of realization and then only to the extent that
the amount realized exceeds the basis of the asset in the hands of
the taxpayer. This being the case, the addition of disallowed excess
investment interest to the basis would produce the fairest tax result
for both the Commissioner and the taxpayer. The taxpayer gets the
benefit of his interest cost - but only when he disposes of the prop-
erty and realizes gain or loss.
Perhaps a far better answer to the entire problem of abuse of the
interest deduction would have been a simple provision requiring the
capitalization of interest paid or accrued on debt used to purchase
or carry certain carefully defined investment assets, where the sole
purpose of the borrowing was to avoid tax. Such a provision would
have avoided most of the problems which must now inevitably ac-
company the administration of section 163 (d). It would also have
94 Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1(b) (ii) (a) (1958).
95Id. § 1.266-1(b) (iii) (b).
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effected the object of the present legislation in a fairly simple way
justifiable in principle, without the drawback of penalizing taxpay-
ers whose borrowing is not motivated solely by tax considerations.
III. DEBT VERSUS EQUITY - 1969 STYLE
In his novel Bleak House, Charles Dickens invented Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce, a mythical case epitomizing the evils of English chancery
practice, which he used as a vehicle for the development of his
characters (several of whom were destroyed by their involvement in
the case). The debt-equity problem is reminiscent of Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce. It has occupied the time and energy of courts and liti-
gants, often causing confusion for the former and disastrous results
for the latter. Sometimes it lurks at the core of a tax controversy
and at others it manifests itself on the periphery. It has a profound
effect upon the expectations of taxpayers, and, therefore, it often
dictates the manner in which they arrange their financial affairs.
Simply stated, the debt-equity issue involves characterizing an
instrument issued by a corporation either as a true "debt" - in
which case a creditor-debtor relationship is established between is-
suer and holder - or denominating it as an "equity" interest - in
which case the holder is treated as having received stock. Obvious-
ly, the interest deduction plays a major role in the tax expectations
of the issuing corporation, since interest paid on an indebtedness is
deductible by the corporation under section 163 (a). If the relation-
ship creates an equity interest, however, then the purported payment
of "interest" becomes a nondeductible dividend. Furthermore, for
the securityholder, repayment of a true debt is treated as a return
of basis to the extent that the principal repayment does not exceed
the taxpayer's basis."" But if the instrument creates an equity inter-
est, the purported repayment of principal may be treated as a re-
demption of the equity interest, taxable either as a dividend or as
capital gain.17 The interest deduction is not always the factor which
9 6 ODE § 1232(a)(2)(A) provides that if the principal payment exceeds the basis
of the obligation, the excess will be treated as capital gain if the underlying claim is a
capital asset in the hands of the payor.
9 7 CODE § 302(b) governs the treatment of redemptions and provides two "safe
harbors" which result in capital gain treatment for redemption proceeds - i.e., the "dis-
proportionate redemption" rule of subsection 302(b)(2) and the "termination of inter-
est" rule of subsection 302(b)(3). Both of these rules operate in a mechanical manner
intended to minimize the uncertainty which pervaded the treatment of the redemptions
prior to the enactment of section 302(b) in 1954. If a redemption will not qualify for
capital gain treatment under either subsection, it may still qualify as a sale or exchange.
if it is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" under subsection 302(b)(1). The latter
carries into the 1954 Code the provisions of its predecessor, section 115(g) of the
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ultimately determines the division of corporate capital structure be-
tween debt and equity. A variety of other tax as well as nontax
considerations may enter into the picture,98 but whatever other con-
siderations may govern the decision, the characterization of the in-
strument will determine the deductibility of interest by the corpora-
tion as well as other tax results.
The issuance of the questionable instrument usually takes place
at the time of incorporation, since this is the point at which the
organizers and investors must make their decisions as to the form of
their investment. Normally, a purported debt instrument will be
issued to evidence a "loan." However, the purported debt instru-
ment also may be issued to evidence an obligation to pay the pur-
chase price of an asset which has purportedly been "sold" to the
corporation. The latter course of action is chosen where the object
is to avoid a tax-free transfer and thus achieve two purposes: First,
to give the corporation a stepped-up basis in the asset which it "pur-
chases," and second, to have the payment of the debt obligation
issued in respect of the purchase price treated as taxable gain when
the obligation is paid.9 As might be expected, taxpayers have made
the characterization difficult by having the corporation issue "hy-
brid" instruments, i.e., instruments which do not follow the usual
form of a debt or equity instrument and are thus not easily classified
as one or the other. The debt-equity controversy will be examined
below in both the incorporation and "sale" contexts.
1939 Code, as well as the vagaries and uncertainties associated with the judicially devel-
oped "essentially equivalent" standard.
9 8 See B. BiTTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 118-19 (2d ed. 1966).
99 CODE § 351 provides that property may be transferred to a corporation without
recognition of gain or loss if the transfer is solely in exchange for stock or securities of the
transferee corporation, and, if immediately after the transfer, the transferor (or trans-
ferors) are in "control" of the corporation as that term is defined in section 36 8(c).
Where such a tax-free exchange has taken place, section 36 2(a) provides that the corpo-
ration's basis in the assets which it receives shall be the same as the basis in the hands of
the transferor. An addition to basis is to be made in the amount of any gain recognized
by the transferor, as would be the case where the latter had received "boot" in addition
to stock and securities, or where liability assumption causes gain to be recognized under
sections 357(b)-(c). In order to avoid the substituted basis requirement of section
36 2(a), the stockholders may cast the transfer in the form of a "sale" of the assets in
order to preclude the application of section 351. If successful, the basis of the assets in
the hands of the corporation would be its cost under section 1012. The cash basis trans-
ferors would argue that they realize no immediate gain on the sale by virtue of the re-
ceipt of a "debt," e.g., a promissory note, in respect of the purchase price, and that their
gain, if any, is taxable only when and if the debt is paid. See, e.g., Burr Oaks Corp. v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C. 635 (1965), aff'd, 365 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1007 (1967).
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A. The Classification Problem at the Time of Incorporation
The judicial response to taxpayer probing of the debt-equity
dichotomy has been the development of a number of criteria against
which a particular debt instrument can be measured to determine if
it is what it purports to be or if it is really an equity interest mas-
querading as debt.100 The test is at best indefinite and unclear, and
not all courts apply its component elements in the same way or
accord them the same weight. The earlier cases generally empha-
sized the "thinness" of equity in relation to debt as the most signifi-
cant element. This has given rise to the so-called "debt-equity ratio"
test which looks to the proportion of debt in relation to the propor-
tion of stock to determine whether the total equity interest is unreal-
istically thin: Too high a ratio of debt to stock results in the char-
acterization of debt as stock. 01
The debt-equity ratio test has been joined by an imposing variety
of other criteria which are used both independently and in conjunc-
tion with the ratio test. Later cases have adopted a somewhat more
flexible approach in which an objective economic standard is applied
to the instrument in question. For example, in its recent opinion in
Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States,"2 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reviewed the criteria normally employed to test a pur-
ported debt instrument0 3 and made the following observation:
The various factors which have been identified in the cases are only
aids in answering the ultimate question whether the investment,
'
0 0 See note 103 infra.
101 See, e.g., Dobkin v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 31 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 192
F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951).
102 398 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1968).
103 See id. at 696, where the court listed the following criteria:
(1) [T~he intent of the parties; (2) the identity between creditors and share-
holders; (3) the extent of participation in management by the holder of the
instrument; (4) the ability of the corporation to obtain funds from outside
sources; (5) the "thinness" of the capital structure in relation to debt;, (6) the
risk involved; (7) the formal indicia of the arrangement; (8) the relative posi-
tion of the obligees as to other creditors regarding the payment of interest and
principal; (9) the voting power of the holder of the instrument;, (10) the pro-
vision of a fixed rate of interest; (11) a contingency on the obligation to repay;
(12) the source of the interest payments; (13) the presence or absence of a
fixed maturity date; (14) the provision for redemption by the corporation;
(15) a provision for redemption at the option of the holder, and (16) the tim-
ing of the advance with reference to the organization of the corporation.
(footnote omitted).
Given these criteria, it is small wonder that, as Professor Surrey has noted, the rules
developed through litigation in this area involve considerable uncertainty. See Surrey,
Income Tax Problems of Corporations and Shareholders: American Law Tax Project -
American Bar Association Committee Study on Legislative Revision, 14 TAx L. REV. 1,
44 (1959).
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analyzed in terms of its economic reality, constitutes risk capital
entirely subject to the fortunes of -the corporate venture or repre-
sents a strict debtor-creditor relationship. 104
The court then went on to define how it proposed to judge the
nature of the instrument:
Under an objective test of economic reality it is useful to compare
the form which a similar transaction would have taken had it been
between the corporation and an outside lender, and if the share-
holder's advance is far more speculative than what an outsider
would make, it is obviously a loan in name only. 105
The two equal shareholders in Fin Hay Realty Co. had each paid
$10,000 for their stock at the time of incorporation in 1934, and
each shareholder had advanced an additional $15,000 to the corpora-
tion, receiving in return its unsecured 6 percent demand note. A
month later, each shareholder advanced an additional $35,000 to
the corporation, and again, the corporation issued to each of them
its unsecured 6 percent demand note. The corporation used its
funds to purchase three apartment buildings, the first having been
acquired for a cash payment of $39,000 and the other two for a
cash payment of $75,000 and a purchase money mortgage of
$100,000. In applying its "objective test of economic reality," the
court concluded that the demand notes were in the nature of equity
rather than debt. It noted that the corporation used the loan pro-
ceeds to purchase its assets (the apartment buildings) and that the
repayment of the notes depended upon an increase in the value of
the real estate and the concomitant ability of the corporation to sell
or refinance it. From this fact, the court concluded that only be-
cause of the special stockholder-corporation relationship were the
two shareholders willing to make this long-term commitment and
to allow the notes to go unpaid.10 6 The court could not conceive
of any outside creditor having risked his capital in 1934 in unse-
cured 6 percent demand notes of this corporation. Consequently,
it held that "the form which the parties gave to their transaction did
not match its economic reality.' 11 7 The notes were treated as equity
and the corporation's interest deductions were disallowed.
104 398 F.2d at 697 (emphasis added).
105 Id. (emphasis added).
106 It was not until 1962 that the Commissioner disallowed the corporation's deduc-
tion for interest paid on the notes. At that time, the property had been refinanced
and the loan proceeds had been used to retire the interest of a deceased shareholder.
The interest of the other shareholder had passed to his daughters who continued to
hold the notes to which they succeeded. Id. at 695-96.
107 Id. at 698.
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The objective economic test appears at first blush to be a con-
siderable improvement over the varied criteria previously used by
the courts."' The fact is, however, that an objective economic test
has two serious drawbacks. First, it completely ignores the intention
of the parties, who may have perfectly valid reasons for arranging
their corporation's capital structure in a given way. Since the prin-
cipal purpose behind the Commissioner's insistence on a "correct"
classification is his desire to entrap those who would use the debt-
equity dichotomy for purposes of tax avoidance, the classification
criteria should definitely take taxpayer intent into account. 19 Sec-
ond, the objective economic test approach to the debt-equity problem
really does no more than draw upon and restate the old criteria.
Whether an outside investor would do what the shareholders are
doing may depend upon such things as the nature of the obligation,
the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date, the proposed source
of repayment, subordination or nonsubordination to trade creditors,
the rate of interest, and so on ad infinitum through the whole spec-
trum of available criteria. Because one cannot predict which of the
available criteria will be included in a particular judicial construc-
tion of the objective economic reality test, Fin Hay Realty Co. creates
no greater certainty than had hitherto existed.
In view of this state of affairs, it is not at all surprising that in
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 Congress undertook to bring some
order to this chaotic problem area. The vehicle fashioned to ac-
complish this goal was new Code section 385,110 a blanket provision
designed to give the Commissioner the authority to issue such regu-
lations "as may be necessary or appropriate" to determine for all
tax purposes whether an interest in a corporation is stock or indebt-
edness. The regulations are to set forth criteria to be considered
in making the necessary distinction, and among other factors may
include:
(1) whether there is a written unconditional promise to pay
on demand or on a specified date a sum certain in money in return
108 For an enumeration of these criteria, see note 103 supra.
109 In his well-known dissent in Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1957), Judge Learned Hand made the argument
that a debt in all respects valid as between a corporation and its stockholder was a "bona
fide debt' and ought to be treated as such except where its only effect upon the stock-
holder-creditor's "beneficial interest" was a tax reduction. Thus, where a valid busi-
ness purpose (other than tax reduction) is furthered by ordering a transaction in a
particular way, Judge Hand suggested that the taxpayer's modus operandi should not be
upset by an undefined notion of "substantial economic reality" which does not make
clear the facts which are considered determinative.
110 CODE § 385 was created by REFORM Acr § 415.
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for an adequate consideration in money or money's worth, and to
pay a fixed rate of interest,
(2) whether there is subordination to or preference over any
indebtedness of the corporation,
(3) the ratio of debt to equity of the corporation,
(4) whether there is convertibility into the stock of the corpora-
tion, and
(5) the relationship between holdings of stock in the corpora-
tion and holdings of the interest in question."'
Congress has thus shifted from the courts to the Commissioner the
responsibility for establishing the criteria which distinguish debt
from equity, and it has offered him five nonexclusive factors which
he may use in discharging that responsibility.
Before proceeding to a discussion of section 385, it should be
noted that this is not the first time that a statutory provision has
been proposed as a means of settling debt-equity controversies. The
original House version of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 con-
tained a proposal which distinguished between "securities," "par-
ticipating stock," and "nonparticipating stock. '"" 2  Under this pro-
posal, an interest deduction would have been allowed only for pay-
ments made in respect of securities."' Securities were defined as
unconditional obligations to pay a sum certain with interest payable
without regard to the level of corporate earnings. This proposal
was rejected as inflexible,"' and, of course, did not appear in the
Code. The American Law Institute also had included a somewhat
more elaborate statutory definition of debt in section X-500 of its
Tax Project." 5 The ALI definition was nonexclusive and included
the following factors: (1) An unconditional obligation with fixed
maturity, issued for adequate consideration; (2) nonsubordination
to trade creditors; (3) no power in the holder to vote for corporate
directors; and (4) interest payable independently of corporate earn-
ings and no later than at maturity of principal. If an obligation did
not meet these tests, the section provided that it could still qualify
as debt if it would be so regarded under current judicial decisions."'
In a general comment on the ALI debt-equity proposals, Profes-
sor Surrey has noted a basic problem which must arise in any statu-
111 CODE § 385(b).
112 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-38 (1954), which discusses H.R.
8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 312.
"3 H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 275 (1954).
114 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954).
115 AMERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE TAX PROJECr § X-500 (1954 Draft).
116 Id.
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tory definition of debt:.. 7 namely, that under any given set of facts,
the inflexible application of particular definitional elements or fac-
tors may be either irrelevant or at least troublesome. Thus, for ex-
ample, trade creditors are simply not an important factor in the
activities of many corporations. What, then, is the significance of
nonsubordination of debt to trade creditors in such a situation?
Similarly, if reasonable expectation of repayment is to be a factor
as it was in Fin Hay Realty Co.," 8 does this introduce too great an
element of uncertainty into the definition?
Obviously, these issues will arise only if the criteria proposed by
the Commissioner are exclusive, for if they are nonexclusive, then
they may be applied in accordance with present judicial practice,
thereby avoiding the inflexibility which is objectionable in an ex-
clusive definition. Professor Surrey feared that some administra-
tors and courts, when confronted with a listing of definitional ele-
ments, might easily choose not to accept the fact that the definition
is nonexclusive." 9 In section 385, there is a list of suggested cri-
teria which the Commissioner may consider in the regulations which
he is to issue. He is free to accept or reject any of the suggested
factors and he may choose to add others. However, there is no in-
dication whatsoever in the mandate given to the Commissioner as
to whether Congress intended that the regulations shall prescribe an
exclusive or nonexclusive test. Should the Commissioner so elect,
he may presumably provide that his regulations constitute the ex-
clusive definition of debt; that any variation from the prescribed
form is fatal; and that such variation will result in characterization
of the instrument as stock. From an administrative point of view,
the temptation to prescribe an exclusive definition must be great
indeed. A nonexclusive listing of definitional factors would only
invite further judicial tinkering with the debt-equity problem, ren-
dering nugatory the broad regulatory authority granted by section
385. In view of the above, and given the Commissioner's under-
standable predilection to construe a questionable debt instrument as
stock, it seems quite likely that the regulations will adopt an ex-
clusive definition: Only careful draftsmanship can serve to avoid
the problems alluded to by Professor Surrey.
If the Commissioner's regulations are to constitute an exclusive
definition of debt, what will be the elements of such a definition?
11' See Surrey, supra note 103, at 44-48.
118 398 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1968).
119 Surrey, supra note 103, at 45.
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Here, of course, one can only speculate, but it seems reasonable to
assume that "troublesome" factors - factors which, if included in
an exclusive definition, would permit either taxpayers or courts too
much leeway and discretion - will be eliminated from the defini-
tion. An example of such a factor is the debt-equity ratio. Fortu-
nately, the ratio is no longer as important as it once was in deter-
mining the debt status of an instrument. Courts in recent years
have both struck down low debt-equity ratios (treating the "debt"
as equity) and have sustained high ratios, depending on the circum-
stances of each case.120  These developments suggest that the new
regulations quite possibly will not include the ratio test. If the test
is dropped, no doubt the issue of thin capitalization would cease to
be as important as it once was, but it may continue to be a matter of
considerable interest to the courts in certain cases. For example,
where the ratio of debt to equity is so overwhelming that there is
virtually no equity at all, a court might determine that the alleged
indebtedness should not be recognized. 121 Thus, even if the Com-
missioner chooses to drop the ratio test altogether, it is doubtful
whether the issue can be avoided in extreme cases. If, however, the
ratio test is not dropped, the Commissioner may settle the matter by
a regulatory provision arbitrarily fixing a given ratio as acceptable.
Thus, the regulation might provide that a debt-equity ratio of up
to 4:1 will be acceptable;' 22 a ratio in excess of 4:1 would then be
regarded as automatically disqualifying the entire debt instrument,
resulting in its treatment as stock. From an administrative point of
12 0 1n Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946), the Supreme Court
cautioned against "obviously excessive" debt-equity ratios. Id. at 526. In that case,
the ratio of debt to equity was 4:1 and was not considered obviously excessive because
"material amounts of capital were invested in stock." Id. Thus, a 4:1 ratio came to
be regarded as safe. However, in Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.
408 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956), a debt-equity ratio of 1:1 was struck
down on the ground that the parties did not intend to enforce payment of the obligations.
Arguing from the Gooding case, taxpayers were able to convince courts that high debt-
equity ratios should be ignored where other considerations justified the characterization
of the purported debt as true debt and not as equity. E.g., Arthur M. Rosenthal, 34 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1507 (1965); Charles B. Curry, 43 T.C. 667 (1965), acquiesced in,
1965-2 CuM. BULL. 4. In some cases the ratio test has been dropped altogether. See
Gloucester Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 183 (1st Cir. 1962).
12 1 See Burr Oaks Corp. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 635 (1965), aff'd, 365 F.2d 24
(7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967), where the corporation had issued
notes in the aggregate amount of $330,000 to three individuals as consideration for the
transfer of certain realty to the corporation. The stock of the corporation was issued
to the wives of two of the note holders and the brothers of the third for a total consider-
ation of $4500. The "notes" were treated as stock and the transaction was therefore
held to be a section 351 exchange rather than a "sale" of the realty. In this case, the
$4500 worth of stock simply floated in a $330,000 sea of indebtedness.
12 2 See Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
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view, this is desirable, but from a taxpayer's point of view, such
rigidity is disastrous and is not justified where legitimate business
interests are served by a higher debt-equity ratio.
Unfortunately, most of the definitional factors which have been
used by the courts in an attempt to distinguish debt from equity are
troublesome in the same sense that the ratio test is troublesome:
They are all more or less applicable in given situations. While these
factors cannot be excluded from a reasonable and comprehensive
definition, their inclusion can only result in further uncertainty and
more litigation. But since the definition to be fixed in the regula-
tions will have to be exclusive to be effective from an administrative
point of view, it will be difficult for the Commissioner to fabricate
a regulatory standard which does more than minimize the evils of
inflexibility and vagueness.
A possible solution to this problem is suggested by the regula-
tions dealing with business entities which are taxable as corpora-
tions pursuant to subsection 7701 (a) (3) .23 In his regulations, the
Commissioner sets forth the six major characteristics of the corpo-
rate enterprise.124  Because it is recognized that an association, trust,
partnership, or other business entity may have some but not all of
these corporate attributes, the regulations take the position that if
the particular entity has more corporate than noncorporate charac-
teristics, it will be classed as a corporation for income tax pur-
poses. 25 A similar test could perhaps be applied to the debt-equity
situation. A regulation could be designed to list the characteristics
or attributes which the Commissioner considers to be essential for a
debt instrument. If a particular instrument has more debt than non-
debt characteristics, it would be denominated debt; if it has fewer
debt than nondebt characteristics, it would be classed as equity.
Such a regulation might be objectionable because of the ease
with which taxpayers could plan around it. It is certainly true that
taxpayers can and do plan around the regulations which define a
corporation for tax purposes, but there is no inherent evil in such a
procedure. In fact, in the case of limited partnerships, the regula-
128 CODE § 7701 (a) (3) provides that the term "corporation" includes "associations,
joint stock companies and insurance companies." The term "association" is not defined
in the Cod.
12 4 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1960). The characteristics are:
(i) Associates, (ii) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains there-
from, (iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v) liability
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tions actually go so far as to provide specific assistance for planning
around the corporate characteristics by pointing out how they can be
avoided. 2 ' Presumably, there are good policy reasons for permit-
ting a taxpayer to utilize certain business entities which may have
one or more corporate characteristics and yet escape corporate classi-
fication. The regulations provide guidance in this area and their
thrust is simply to prevent an essentially corporate entity from es-
caping the tax consequences appropriate to it under the statute.
Similarly, in the debt-equity area there is nothing inherently evil
in the use of debt instruments, and there is often a good and suffi-
cient business reason for using debt in the corporate capital structure.
Given a set of basic attributes which are characteristic of debt, a
preponderance of the debt attributes should result in debt classifica-
tion. It is perhaps easier to specify and define the essential charac-
teristics of a corporation than it is to specify and define those of a
debt instrument where the creditor is a shareholder. Yet whatever
the merits of this proposition, it seems that Congress in its wisdom
has determined that the Commissioner shall establish and define
these characteristics. It appears, then, that a listing of the major
characteristics as developed in the course of litigation, with a proviso
that classification shall depend on whether debt or nondebt charac-
teristics predominate, would be a workable solution to the problem.
Such a solution might not satisfy all parties, but it has proved to be
acceptable in distinguishing between corporate and noncorporate
business entities, and it should function at least as well in the debt-
equity area.
B. The Classification Problem Upon a "Sale" to a
Controlled Corporation
It has previously been noted that debt instruments are often is-
sued not only in conjunction with the formation of a corporation,
but also as consideration for a purported "sale" of assets by a share-
holder to a controlled corporation. 127  The purpose of such a trans-
action is to avoid the nonrecognition provisions of section 351,128
so that the corporation will receive a stepped-up basis for the assets
126 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (b) (1960), deals specifically with the corporate char-
acteristics of limited partnerships and gives specific examples of how particular corporate
characteristics may be avoided.
127 See text accompanying notes 96-99 supra.
1 28 See note 99 supra.
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"purchased" and the shareholder-seller will receive a tax-free return
of capital to the extent of his basis in the debt instrument.'29
The courts have had considerable difficulty in developing criteria
to distinguish between a purported sale and a tax-free section 351
exchange. Since a debt instrument is usually issued by the trans-
feree corporation as consideration for the transfer, it is not surpris-
ing that, in general, the courts have attempted to solve the sale prob-
lem by determining whether such debt is valid debt or equity. This
determination is made on the basis of the same judicial criteria
which are used to distinguish debt from equity in the incorporation
context. 130 If the purported debt is classified as equity, then of
course there can be no sale, for the shareholder has simply trans-
ferred property to the controlled corporation in exchange for addi-
tional equity - clearly a section 351 transaction. 3' If, on the other
hand, the debt is classified as valid debt, the transaction is viewed
as a sale. The problem in these cases is that the debt-equity ques-
tion which is raised is only partly relevant to the question of whether
the transaction constitutes a sale as opposed to a section 351 ex-
change. Once it is determined that the instrument is debt rather
than equity, the courts have tended not to proceed to the further
inquiry of whether the debt is a "security" within the meaning of
section 351132 and therefore still subject to the nonrecognition and
basis provisions of that section. They simply hold that if the in-
strument is debt, the transaction is a sale. 3 3 Although the term se-
curity is not defined in either the Code or Regulations, there is no
inherent reason why a debt instrument may not constitute a security.
Therefore, the inquiry should not terminate with the conclusion that
129 See, e.g., Burr Oaks Corp. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 635 (1965), aff'd, 365 F.2d
24 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967); Charles E. Curry, 43 T.C. 667
(1965), acquiesced in, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 4.
'
3 0 See note 103 supra.
131 In addition to this result, the substituted basis provisions of section 362 (a) (gov-
erning basis to the corporation in a section 351 exchange) will be applicable so as to de-
prive the corporation of its anticipated stepped-up basis. See note 99 supra.
132 CODE § 351 applies where the transferor receives, in exchange for the transfer
of assets, "stock or securities" of the controlled corporation. Consequently, cassifica-
tion of the debt as stock, i.e., equity, does not preclude the possibility that the debt is a
"security" and that the transaction is therefore still within the purview of section 351.
133 See J.I. Morgan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 881 (1958), rev'd on' other
grounds, 272 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1959). The rationale for this view may be that a. short-
term debt instrument is so much like cash that gain should be recognized - i.e., a short-
term note may be treated as "boot" This theory, however, does not explain why the
courts have treated as sales those transactions in which the purchase price payable by the
controlled corporation is evidenced by a long-term installment obligation, as in J.L
Morgan, Inc.
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the instrument is debt.134 The Tax Court now seems to have moved
in this direction. Thus, in George A. Nye,135 it was held that a 10-
year installment note issued to a shareholder as consideration for a
purported sale of assets to his controlled corporation was a security,
although properly classified as debt. In consequence of this ap-
proach, the transaction resulted in nonrecognition of gain under sec-
tion 351 and a substituted basis for the assets transferred to the
corporation.
Now that the possibility of classification of debt as a security
has been recognized, the problem will shift to establishing the defini-
tion of a security. However, in view of the decision in Camp Wol-
ters Enterprises, Inc., 31 the definition may no longer depend solely
upon the duration of the debt obligation, but upon an "overall eval-
uation of the nature of the debt.' '31 7 In Prentis v. United States,"38
for example, it was held that a 6-month promissory note was a se-
curity within the meaning of subsections 112(b) (4) and (b) (5) of
the 1939 Code 9 based on an overall evaluation of the transaction.
Thus the courts appear to be moving toward a logical resolution of
the sale-section 351 problem.
The question now, however, is what effect section 385 will have
upon this aspect of the debt-equity issue. If the factors established
as definitional criteria will result in an equity characterization of
many instruments which might otherwise have been denominated as
debt, the result will be that the courts will have far less opportunity
to refine the meaning of the term security. A broader equity classi-
fication will necessarily result in the treatment of a large number of
purported sales as section 351 exchanges, thus precluding further
inquiry into the possibility that the debt instruments issued in such
exchanges are securities. This would be unfortunate for two rea-
sons. First, since neither the Code nor the regulations define the
term security, further refinement must necessarily come from the
courts. A broader equity classification will thus severely restrict the
opportunities for a much needed judicial definition of the term.
Second, a shareholder who arranges his affairs so as to receive se-
14 See D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 117 (1966); Comment, Section 351
Transfers to Controlled Corporations: The Forgotten Term - "Securities", 114 U. PA.
L REv. 314 (1965).
135 50 T.C. 203 (1968).
136 22 T.C. 737 (1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1956).
137 Id. at 751.
138 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9417 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
139 53 Stat. 24 (1939).
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curties in addition to stock should not be forced into a position of
having received stock by virtue of an all embracing definition of the
term equity. Section 351 does, after all, contemplate a tax-free ex-
change for stock and securities and not merely for stock. The dan-
ger of permitting a stepped-up basis to the corporation is avoided
where the transferor's interest continues either as stock or security,
while at the same time, the interest deduction continues to be avail-
able in respect of an instrument which is a valid debt. Thus, since
the Commissioner's definition of equity under the regulations issued
pursuant to the newly created statute is apt to be fairly broad, the
effect upon the sale and security aspect of the problem may be un-
desirable.140
IV. LIMITATION OF THE INTEREST DEDUCTION
IN CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
Congressional use of the tax laws to achieve nontax policy ob-
jectives has become so common a practice that it is now accepted as
a fairly permanent feature of the tax scene.141 The Tax Reform
Act of 1969 is no exception to this procedure; for it contains a
number of provisions aimed primarily at achieving nontax legisla-
tive purposes.' One significant example of such a policy-oriented
provision stems from congressional concern over the proliferation
of merger activity, particularly in the area of conglomerate acquisi-
tions in which debt instruments - generally convertible debentures
- are issued by the acquiring conglomerate in exchange for stock
or assets of the acquired corporation. 43 In order to discourage such
140 Perhaps a better solution to the problem of defining "securities" would be to
eliminate the term altogether from section 351 and to substitute therefor the word
"indebtedness," which would apply to an instrument having a stated maturity of 1 year
or more. See Surrey, supra note 103, at 49.
141 The practice is criticized by many able commentators who believe that the tax
laws should generally be neutral in relation to various groups of taxpayers and with re-
spect to nontax policy matters. See, e.g., Blum, Federal Income Tax Reform - Twenty
Questions, 41 TAXEs 672, 679 (1963).
14 2 For example, sections 521(a) and (b) of the Reform Act eliminate the use of the
double declining balance and sum of the years-digits depreciation methods for new real
property. However, an exception is made for new residential real property so that these
fast depreciation methods may be used with respect thereto. Obviously there is a non-
tax policy objective involved in the retention of a substantial depreciation tax shelter
for new residential realty, i.e., to attract investment into the residential real property
sector. The same is true of the special provisions of section 521 (a) of the Reform Act
which allows recovery of rehabilitation expenditures on low- and moderate-income
housing on the basis of a 5-year useful life - straight line method. This, too, is ob-
viously a policy-oriented tax provision.
143 During 1968, merger announcements increased 50 percent over 1967, and
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acquisition activity, the Reform Act contains a provision which se-
verely limits interest which an acquiring corporation may deduct in
respect of debt instruments issued to acquire the stock or assets of
another corporation. Such a provision clearly is not a tax reform
provision in its own right; it is essentially a manipulation of the tax
law designed to achieve certain objectives within the province of
antitrust law, securities regulation, accounting, and basic economic
policy.
The interest deduction, however, can be an effective control
mechanism because of its importance in planning conglomerate
acquisitions. The tax benefits for the acquiring corporation are the
same as those which generally inure to a corporation with a signifi-
cant amount of debt in its capital structure, i.e., the interest incur-
red on the debt is deductible. For example, $10 million in 8 per-
cent 25-year debentures will result in total interest deductions of
$20 million. At current corporate rates, this means a tax saving
over the entire 25-year period of $9.6 million. This tax saving, plus
the fact that debt requires no immediate capital outlay, causes no
dilution of ownership, and the interest can be paid out of the ac-
quired corporation's anticipated profits, all conspire to make a debt-
financed acquisition attractive indeed.14 1
The policy of the Reform Act is implemented by the provisions
of new Code section 279.145 This section establishes a category of
corporate debt called "corporate acquisition indebtedness," which
is defined as a bond, debenture, note, certificate, or other evidence
of indebtedness issued by a corporation as consideration for the ac-
quisition of not less than 5 percent of the combined voting power of
all classes of stock, or not less than two-thirds of all the operating
assets - other than cash - of another corporation. In order to be
classified as corporate acquisition indebtedness, the instrument must
comply with the following criteria: (1) It must be subordinated to
the claims of trade creditors of the issuing corporation or expressly
subordinated to the payment of any substantial amount of unsecured
indebtedness of the issuing corporation; (2) it must be convertible
into stock of the issuing corporation or it must be part of an invest-
ment unit which includes an option to acquire stock of the issuing
corporation; and (3) the ratio of debt to equity of the issuing
merger activity during the first part of 1969 was substantially greater than for the same
period in 1968. See Sax, supra note 91, at 235-36 nn.2-3.
144ld. at 237.
145 REFORM AcT § 411.
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corporation must not exceed 2:1 as of the last day of the taxable year
in which any obligation is issued for the acquisition of stock or
assets of the acquired corporation, or the projected earnings of the
issuing corporation must not exceed three times the annual interest to
be paid or incurred.148 Subsection 279 (c) (2) provides that the term
"ratio of debt to equity" shall mean the ratio of the total indebted-
ness of the issuing corporation to the adjusted basis of all its assets
- including money - less such total indebtedness. Thus, the ratio
test used in this context differs markedly from the ratio test which
is applied in the usual debt-equity situation. In the latter case, the
ratio of shareholder debt to shareholder equity is the critical issue.
Once it is determined under sections 279(b) and (c) that the
debt meets the requirements of corporate acquisition indebtedness
and is issued for the purpose of stock or asset acquisition, section
279(a) provides the legislation's major thrust by disallowing the
deduction for interest incurred in respect of such indebtedness to
the extent that such interest exceeds $5 million. Further, subsection
279(a) (2) requires that the $5 million floor may be reduced by the
amount of interest paid or incurred on debt issued after December
31, 1967, as consideration for the proscribed stock or asset acquisi-
tion, but which does not qualify as corporate acquisition indebted-
ness under the tests set forth in section 279(b). These provisions
operate to effectively discourage the use of subordinated convertible
debentures, the favorite instrument used to effect corporate com-
binations. 47
The application of section 279 to debt issued in connection with
a corporate acquisition does not prevent the concurrent application
of section 385, which authorizes the Commissioner to issue regula-
tions defining debt and equity "for purposes of this title."' 48 Thus,
because the regulations to be issued under section 385 will be appli-
cable for all purposes arising under the income tax law, they must
necessarily cut across the provisions of section 279. It seems rather
obvious that the very tests which establish the status of debt as
corporate acquisition indebtedness also point to its classification as
equity. Subordination to general creditors and unsecured claims,
convertibility to stock, and a ratio test of 2:1 based on the ratio of
146 These requirements are set forth in detail in new CODE § 279(b).
147 The convertibility feature enables the debenture holder to'benefit from the ap-
preciation in value of the acquired corporation's stock, since the convertible debenturb
will increase in value as the value of the stock approaches the conversion price. In the
meantime, the holder enjoys an assured return on his investment.
148 CODE § 385(a).
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all debt to the adjusted basis of all assets are all indicia of equity
rather than debt.149  This point was specifically considered by the
House Ways and Means Committee Report which stated:
Your committee does not believe that many corporate bonds
and debentures which presently are being treated as debt are, in
fact, debt rather than equity. In fact, some security exchanges
have even raised questions as to listing some of these securities as
"bonds" or indebtedness. The characteristics of these bonds or
debentures, such as convertibility and subordination, in many cases
make them more closely akin to stock than to debt. In other
words, the characteristics of -the obligation make the interest in the
corporation which it represents more similar to a stockholder's in-
terest than to a creditor's interest. Your committee is particularly
concerned with the present situation, which involves an increasing
amount of debt used for corporate acquisition purposes, in view of
the fact that it normally is much easier to effect a substitution of
debt for equity at the time of corporate acquisition.' 50
The Committee then concluded that even if a transaction manages
to find refuge within one of the section 279 provisos - the $5
million floor or the limited application to "corporate acquisition in-
debtedness" - the interest paid on acquisition debt may neverthe-
less be fully disallowed under the general rule that interest must be
incurred in respect of debt in order to be deductible.' " ' The fore-
going clearly indicates that the special disallowance rules of section
279(a) will apply only if the corporate acquisition indebtedness has
first cleared the hurdle of section 385 and qualifies generally as
debt under the regulations to be prescribed thereunder. Given the
fact that the criteria which define corporate acquisition indebted-
ness are attributes which have traditionally led to an equity classifi-
cation within the context of section 385, it appears probable that
section 279 will operate only on a limited number of debt instru-
ments. Considering that all the attributes of corporate acquisition
indebtedness must simultaneously be present in order for an instru-
ment to be covered by section 279, it should not be difficult for
corporations to plan around that section by deleting one or more of
those attributes. The critical question would then become whether
such an instrument would possess sufficient attributes of debt to
pass muster under section 385.
149 These factors are included in the suggested criteria listed in section 385, though
the debt-equity ratio mentioned in that section is the conventional shareholder debt-
equity ratio rather than the special ratio defined in section 279(c).
150 H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 104 (1969) (emphasis
added).
151 Id. at 104-05.
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Despite the harshness of the dual application of sections 279 and
385, there is no reason why corporate acquisition indebtedness
should not be subjected to the Commissioner's scrutiny under sec-
tion 385. The application of a general debt-equity test to such in-
struments is a perfectly reasonable procedure. What is questionable,
however, is the wisdom and propriety of disallowing all or a part
of the interest incurred on debt obligations issued in corporate ac-
quisitions which manage to qualify as valid debt. It is uncertain
whether, under the regulations drafted pursuant to section 385, it
will be possible for subordinated convertible debentures issued by a
corporation with a low debt-equity ratio to qualify as valid debt.
What is beyond cavil, however, is the impropriety of a statute which
would classify that potential valid debt as equity.
Section 163 (a) allows a deduction for interest paid or accrued
on indebtedness. Assuming a valid debt, the allowance of the de-
duction is mandatory. New section 163 (d), however, limits an in-
dividual's deduction for interest incurred on indebtedness used to
purchase or carry investment assets. This limitation is firmly
grounded in sound tax policy and is not intended as an aid to non-
tax policy objectives. It prevents taxpayers from trading upon the
interest deduction in order to establish capital values.152 It is in-
tended as unadorned tax reform, though one may question whether
it represents the best solution to the problem it attempts to solve.
With respect to section 279 - which also may disallow interest in-
curred on valid debt - can it be said that there is a valid argument
in its favor based on tax reform grounds and not merely on the basis
of nontax policy? The question is important because the introduc-
tion of nontax policy provisions diminishes the neutrality of the tax
laws and renders it difficult to construct a rational and consistent
tax jurisprudence. Numerous provisions of the tax law are the re-
suit of the play of political forces rather than the application of
consistent tax theory. When congressional antimerger schemes (or
other nontax policy objectives) are added to the existing political
pressures in the tax field, the construction of a rational tax system
becomes a well nigh impossible task.
What, then, are the purely tax merits (if any) of the new sec-
tion 279? Let us assume that a corporation issues its debt obliga-
tion - classified as valid debt under the future section 385 regula-
tions - in order to acquire stock or assets of another corporation.
If the corporation acquires stock or assets it will do so either for
152 See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
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investment purposes or to gain control of the acquired corporation.
If the principle purpose of the stock or asset acquisition is invest-
ment, there is absolutely no reason why the corporation should be
permitted to use the interest deduction generated by the debt to
establish capital values, i.e., to achieve capital gains while sheltering
its ordinary business income with an interest deduction. In other
words, in the investment situation, section 279 tends to act as the
logical corporate counterpart of section 163 (d) which disallows "ex-
cess investment interest" for individuals. It has, however, two draw-
backs in this respect. First, like its counterpart, section 163 (d),153 it
has a significant ($5 million) exemption which allows much of the
proscribed activity to avoid its impact. Second, it does not apply
where the debt is issued to acquire an interest of not less than 5 per-
cent of the total combined voting power of all classes of voting
stock of the acquired corporation. 154  These limitations may make
sense in the antimerger policy context, but they do not make sense
from a tax reform viewpoint.
Where the acquisition debt - again, valid debt under the fu-
ture section 385 regulations - is issued to obtain either sufficient
stock to control the acquired corporation or a substantial portion
of its operating assets, the analogy of section 163 (d) breaks down.
Here the debt is issued to acquire a business which produces busi-
ness income taxable to the acquired or acquiring corporation at
ordinary corporate rates. In these circumstances, the acquiring cor-
poration is not really trading on the interest deduction to establish
capital values. It may, and probably will, use the earnings of
the acquired corporation to pay the interest on the acquisition debt,
but those earnings will be subject to tax. Theoretically, and from a
purely tax point of view, disallowance of the interest is not justified.
It can be defended only by pointing to a nontax policy objective -
the discouragement of debt-financed merger activity. But even this
nontax element is questionable because the congressional concern
in this area is merger activity financed by debt which in reality is
equity. If the debt passes muster as valid debt under the section
385 regulations, the existence of a valid nontax policy is rendered
questionable. Thus, it is precisely in the noninvestment acquisition,
the acquisition of control, that the case for the disallowance of the
interest under section 279 is weakest. The foregoing analysis leads
to the conclusion that section 279 is merely a piece of tax legislation
153See CODE § 163(d) (1) (A) & text accompanying note 74 supra.
154 CODE § 279(d)(5).
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whose ramifications were not thoroughly explored and which should,
perhaps, have been somewhat refined so as to allow for different
treatment of interest on valid debt used for noninvestment purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
The Code contains two diametrically opposed provisions: Sec-
tion 163 (a), which authorizes cash basis accounting, and sections
446(b) and 461, which effectively authorize the Commissioner to
disallow cash basis accounting when its use would distort income.
With regard to interest prepayments, the courts sought to reconcile
the two provisions by preserving the taxpayer's right to account on
the cash basis except where he had executed a sham or nonpurposive
transaction. This solution had the effect of defining distortion sub-
jectively, in terms of taxpayer intent. The Commissioner registered
his dislike for the judicial resolution and his displeasure over tax-
payer attempts to stretch its limits by issuing a ruling which, in ef-
fect, denies the taxpayer the right to utilize cash basis accounting for
interest prepayments. While the Commissioner has the discretion to
substitute an objective standard for the subjective judicial test, the
legislative history of the sections which grant him such discretion
suggest it was not intended that he abdicate his discretion by creat-
ing a standard which precludes the use of cash basis accounting. A
proper objective definition of distortion would contain meaningful
differentiations between large and small prepayments, not a single
rule covering both dimes and dollars. Given the lack of such a dis-
criminating objective standard, the subjective judicial resolution -
complete disallowance of the deduction in cases involving sham or
nonpurposive activity - is superior to the across-the-board pro rata
accrual required by Revenue Ruling 68-643. The judicial rule has
a much harsher impact on those whom it touches, but its selectivity
insures that only the black-hearted will feel its wrath. Further, any
objective standard which is similarly discriminating would probably
cover almost an identical group of taxpayers, for few persons have
a legitimate need to prepay large amounts of interest. The Com-
missioner's power to require the use of a proper accounting method
does not justify a ruling which places an entire species of cash basis
transactions in an undifferentiated category requiring accrual treat-
ment. It is submitted that the judicial approach is preferable, for
it preserves the basic function of cash basis accounting: namely, to
provide a simple bookkeeping method which does no violence to the
ordinary taxpayer's concept of income and expenses.
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The commentators' suggestion that the ruling could be justified
by rationales other than discretion is unconvincing. The capitaliza-
tion and deposit theories are indeed weak reeds to support such
a broad exercise of administrative discretion. Capitalization simply
does not apply to the sham transaction or to the transaction having
no purposive activity other than tax avoidance, because in the former
the prepaid item is not really interest and in the latter it has no
independent economic function. In these cases, the courts already
prescribe disallowance as the logical method for dealing with pre-
paid interest. It would be a strange result indeed if the taxpayer
were to be rewarded with accrual in such cases rather than punished
with disallowance. As to other cases, it seems that the capitaliza-
tion notion is again not the proper answer. Where the prepayment
of interest is for the purpose of establishing capital values (the
California land transaction) or for trading on the interest deduc-
tion to achieve a capital gain position (using loan proceeds to pur-
chase securities) the Code pattern points to disallowance, not to
accrual. While the question of whether prepaid interest should be
capitalized and added to the basis of the asset is not easily answered,
it is clear that in the situation which most concerns the Commis-
sioner - use of prepaid interest to create capital values - the an-
swer to such abuse is disallowance, not capitalization. This leaves
for consideration only the routine loan transaction in which interest
is prepaid. In these situations the taxpayer is merely utilizing
the Code's express provision for cash basis accounting within the
context of a bona fide transaction, and while the capitalization argu-
ment could be applied, because of both the inherent nature of the
transaction and the de minimis amount involved, it seems inadvisible
to do so.
The deposit theory is just as weak, for it rests on the assumption
that the parties intended the prepaid interest to be refundable.
Where there is no intention that a prepayment is to be refunded, or
if it is to be refunded only upon the happening of some contingency
beyond the control of the parties, the cases support the deductibility
of the prepayment and its includibility in the income of the recipient
in the year the payment is made. Thus, in the bona fide loan situa-
tion, a refund is not intended and the prepaid interest should not
be treated as a deposit. If such refund is contemplated, then the
transaction may well be something other than what it purports to
be and can be handled under the Goldstein principle. It appears,
therefore, that Revenue Ruling 68-643, though a response to a jus-
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tified and genuine concern, works a great deal of mischief and has
attracted a supporting structure of highly questionable rationales.
The arrival of new section 163(d) is also an unfortunate de-
velopment. Its object is to discourage the use of borrowed funds to
finance the purchase of non-income-producing property or of prop-
erty which will ultimately result in capital gain, since such borrow-
ing results in a large current interest deduction which shelters ordi-
nary income. The statute, however, is drafted so that it actually
offers a safe harbor for all but the most ambitious of borrowers.
This is accomplished by establishing a deduction floor which insures
the deductibility of large amounts of interest by persons fortunate
enough to have large amounts of investment income and capital
gains. Since borrowing to purchase investment assets allows a tax-
payer to trade on the interest deduction and thereby establish capi-
tal values, it would have been logical to extend the total disallow-
ance pattern of section 264 to this situation. It is difficult to see
how section 163 (d), in its present form, can properly be called a re-
form provision.
The courts have wrestled unsuccessfully with the debt-equity
problem for many years. There is no assurance, however, that leav-
ing the problem to be solved by administrative regulation as pro-
posed in section 385 of the Code will result in a better or more
acceptable solution. The grant of authority to distinguish be-
tween debt and equity by regulation is tantamount to the establish-
ment of a statutory definition and it therefore suffers from the
weaknesses inherent in a statutory definition. If the definition is
to be really effective, it should be exclusive, and if it is exclusive,
it may well be unbearably rigid. On the other hand, a nonexclusive
definition does not necessarily solve the problem because under such
a definition the debt-equity distinction will remain the judicial and
administrative nightmare which it is now. Since the Commissioner
now has the ball and must run with it, perhaps he would be well
advised to follow the form established in his regulations dealing
with associations taxable as corporations, i.e., to enumerate a broad
list of debt characteristics, so that the predominant characteristics of
a particular instrument will determine its classification. The tax-
payer, of course, will be able to achieve his objective by some broken
field running around, about, and through such regulations, but that
is precisely what he must do now, and regulations such as those
suggested would at least define the rules of the game and the
boundaries of the field.
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The provisions of new section 279 are inextricably intertwined
with those of the general debt-equity provisions of new section 385.
Assuming that a corporation may issue corporate acquisition indebt-
edness which will qualify as valid debt under the regulations to be
issued pursuant to section 385, it seems that there is no real reason
for an interest deduction floor of $5 million where the purpose of
the acquisition is investment. There is no reason why a corpora-
tion should be able to borrow or to issue its own debt and trade
upon the interest deduction so generated to obtain investment assets.
On the other hand, where control is acquired in the acquisition
transaction, the assets or stock obtained with the borrowing produce
ordinary income and the deduction for interest should be allowed
in full. While this would nullify the section's antimerger impact,
from a purely tax point of view the deduction is justified.
In view of the many theoretical and administrative problems
posed by Revenue Ruling 68-643 and the interest provisions of the
Reform Act, it is small wonder that together they have caused an-
other periodic shock wave that has stirred the tax world and goaded
its commentators into action. No doubt this activity will subside,
but only until another seismic disturbance destroys the uneasy calm
that characterizes the world of federal income taxation.
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